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ABSTRACT
My thesis consists of two separate essays, the second of which is joint work. Both essays analyze
the book-tax income gap and offer explanations regarding its recent rise and fall.
Many view the book-tax income gap as a measure of tax sheltering. Economists and legislators
almost exclusively interpret changes in the book-tax income gap as due to changes in tax
sheltering behavior. This paper studies alternative factors which influence the book-tax income
gap. I find that changes to the calculation of book income, general business conditions and
earnings management explain approximately 60% of the variation in the book-tax income gap.
This result suggests that the book-tax income gap is a noisier measure of tax sheltering than
previously thought. My results establish that, while tax sheltering may influence the book-tax
income gap, significant alternative influences also exist.
Although book-tax differences can result from either "permanent" or "temporary" differences,
there has been little systematic analysis of the relative importance of these two components. The
second essay explores the relative importance of permanent and temporary differences by
compiling data on deferred tax assets, which are the cumulative effect of past temporary
differences. We find that temporary differences are frequently as important, or more important,
than permanent differences in contributing to the difference between book and taxable income. In
our sample, temporary differences which increase the book-tax income gap are more prevalent
and larger than temporary differences which decrease it. Our data demonstrates that the growth of
the book-tax income gap is due both to firms permanently reducing their tax burden and to firms
temporarily deferring their tax burdens.
In total, my thesis suggests that recent changes in the book-tax income gap may be exogenous and
transitory, due to changes to the calculation of book income, general business conditions or other
factors which generate temporary differences, rather than due to the deceptive and permanent
influence of tax sheltering.
Thesis Supervisor: S.P. Kothari
Title: Gordon Y. Billard Professor of Management
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Introduction
While the book-tax income gap is an often-used measure of tax sheltering, the properties
of the book-tax income gap have not been studied in detail. My thesis aims to provide
information on the properties of the book-tax income gap through two separate but related studies.
First, I study the factors which influence the book-tax income gap. I model five factors,
including tax sheltering, which affect the book-tax income gap. I empirically test this model
using three of the five factors--changes to the calculation of book income, general business
conditions and earnings management. These tests provide indirect evidence on the relationship
between tax sheltering and the book-tax income gap by demonstrating that alternative factors
explain over half of the variation in the book-tax income gap. My results establish that, while tax
sheltering may influence the book-tax income gap, significant alternative influences also exist.
Second, my co-authors and I study temporary differences, which are one of the two
components of the book-tax income gap. Temporary differences arise when the rules for
calculating book and taxable income treat the timing for inclusion of an income or expense item
differently. Temporary differences are so named because eventually the timing of tax and book
inclusion become in sync and the particular temporary difference is removed.
By studying deferred tax positions, which are the cumulative effect of temporary
differences, my co-authors and I provide information on temporary differences. We find that
temporary differences are the largest component of the book-tax income gap. Temporary
differences which increase the book-tax income gap are more prevalent and larger in our sample
than temporary differences which decrease it. Together, these findings suggest that the growth of
the book-tax income gap is due both to firms permanently reducing their tax burden and to firms
temporarily deferring their tax burdens.
After demonstrating that temporary differences have contributed to the rise in the book-
tax income gap, the second essay investigates the types and distribution of temporary differences
in our sample as well as the potential net income impact of the resultant deferred tax positions.
First, we show that the rise in temporary differences which increase the book-tax income gap are
attributable to a number of categories, including Property, Leases and Valuation Allowance.
Second, we find that there is substantial heterogeneity in the size of deferred tax positions. While
half our sample reports a deferred tax position less than three percent of assets, approximately ten
percent reports a deferred tax position in excess of ten percent of assets. Firms with large deferred
tax assets may oppose policy changes that reduce the value of these positions. Finally, we
illustrate how revaluation of a temporary difference can affect net income by considering the
effects of a change in the statutory corporate tax rate. Our results suggest that if the federal rate
had been reduced from 35 to 30 percent in 2004, the resulting deferred tax revaluation would have
raised aggregate net income for U.S. corporations by about $60.5 billion, or 7.4 percent of GDP.
My thesis indicates that recent changes in the book-tax income gap are due at least in part
to factors other than tax sheltering. The first essay demonstrates that changes to the calculation of
book income alone explain more than 50% of the variation in the book-tax income gap. The
second essay shows that much of the book-tax income gap is attributable to differences which will
eventually reverse. Together, these two essays suggest that recent changes in the book-tax income
gap are more innocuous than insidious.
Chapter One:
Interpreting Fluctuations in the Book-Tax Income Gap as Tax Sheltering:
Alternative Explanations
1. INTRODUCTION
The difference between book income and taxable income is often viewed as an indicator
of tax sheltering.' For example, in testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee,
Talisman (1999) graphs the difference between book and taxable income (the book-tax income
gap) to suggest increases in tax sheltering behavior during the mid 1990's. Similarly, in an
interview with Frontline on PBS for its series "Tax Me If You Can", former Treasury Secretary
Lawrence Summers stated, "There's always been a [book-tax income] gap, but the gap gapped...It
was pretty obvious that the reason had to be more shelter[s]..."
However, the book-tax income gap does not arise solely because of tax sheltering. Book
reporting requirements (GAAP) and book reporting behavior (earnings management and fraud)
shape book income. Tax reporting requirements (tax code) in addition to tax reporting behavior
(both minimization and evasion) affect taxable income. General business conditions (GBC)
typically influence book and taxable income differently, thereby affecting the book-tax income
gap. The effect of various factors on the book-tax income gap has not been studied. Until tax
sheltering is demonstrated to dramatically impact the book-tax income gap or alterative factors are
excluded, changes in the book-tax income gap cannot credibly be interpreted as exclusively due to
changes in tax sheltering behavior.
A challenge in researching tax sheltering is that tax sheltering is difficult to define and to
measure; there is often not a bright line separating legal, and optimal, tax planning from illegal tax
'"Book-tax differences are a significant hallmark of tax shelters..." state Garlett and Burt (2007). This opinion
is reiterated on websites dedicated to tax policy, such as Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Additionally,
inconsistent financial and tax accounting treatment is on the IRS's list of Characteristics of Corporate Tax
Shelters.
avoidance.2 Graetz (1999) says illegal tax avoidance is "a deal done by very smart people that,
absent tax considerations, would be very stupid." This economic substance argument--that tax
shelters are arrangements that lack any economic substance other than to minimize or avoid
taxes-is the first characteristic on the IRS's list of Characteristics of Tax Shelters.3 Consistent
with the IRS's list of characteristics, I define illegal tax avoidance as transactions which the IRS
prohibits or considers illegal, especially those labeled as Listed or Reportable Transactions. I
consider optimal tax planning to be tax minimization through such legal means as the use of NOL
Carryforwards, tax credits, properly recorded stock option compensation and investments in tax-
exempt bonds.4  While the broad definition of tax sheltering-activities which decrease tax
liability--does include both legal tax planning and illegal tax avoidance, it is illegal tax avoidance
that causes concern. For the rest of this paper, I refer to illegal tax avoidance as "tax sheltering".
Recent working papers link the size of book-tax differences with the presence of a tax
shelter. Both Wilson (2008) and Lisowsky (2008) use small samples of known tax shelters and
find a positive relationship between measures of the book-tax gap and the likelihood a firm has
engaged in a shelter. While these papers do empirically associate measures of the book-tax
income gap with sheltering, they do not provide an estimate of the magnitude or variation in
the book-tax income gap that can be attributed to tax shelters. I provide evidence on a
particular aspect of the relationship between tax sheltering and the book-tax income gap-the
variation in the gap caused by tax sheltering-through an indirect approach. I study the influence
of factors other than tax sheltering on the book-tax income gap. I develop a simple model of the
2 In fact, illegal tax avoidance may be optimal for the firm in some cases, depending on the present value of the
tax shelter, the probability of detection and the expected fines if detected. For the purposes of this paper,
however, I assume that legal tax planning is optimal and illegal tax avoidance is sub-optimal.
3The complete list is: lack of meaningful economic risk of loss or potential gain, inconsistent financial and tax
accounting treatment, presence of tax-indifferent parties, complexity, unnecessary steps or novel investments,
promotion or marketing, confidentiality, high transaction costs and risk reduction arrangements. Not all of these
characteristics will be present in every tax shelter and some characteristics may be present in situations that are
not deemed to be tax shelters.
4 I acknowledge the gray area between optimal tax planning and illegal tax avoidance, including manipulating
accruals to maximize the use of expiring NOLs and excessive us of stock option compensation.
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determinants of the book-tax income gap. These determinants include Changes to GAAP
Accounting, Earnings Management and General Business Conditions.
I find that changes to the calculation of book income alone explain more than 50% of the
variation in the book-tax income gap. The GAAP accounting changes I study largely decrease the
gap, suggesting the book-tax income gap would have been even larger in their absence. While
Earnings Management does not contribute much explanatory power, General Business Conditions
do offer additional explanatory power; both are significantly related to the book-tax income gap in
all specifications. General Business Conditions and Earnings Management increase the gap,
offering evidence on alternative factors which contribute to the book-tax income gap increase in
the mid- to late-1990's. These results identify important factors other than tax sheltering that
significantly affect the book-tax income gap.
Financial statement variables have been considered as explanations for the book-tax
income gap in prior literature (see Manzon and Plesko, 2002). My research advances this
literature, making three contributions. First, I study changes in specific book reporting
requirements. Analyzing the effect of book reporting requirements on the book-tax income gap
through changes in these requirements is a powerful test of their effect. Second, I develop a
simple model that outlines five specific factors that influence the book-tax income gap. The
model provides a framework for defining and interpreting variables. Finally, I develop variables
that are not likely to be associated with tax sheltering for some of the factors outlined in my
model: GAAP Accounting Changes, General Business Conditions and Earnings Management.
This allows me to estimate the impact that factors other than tax sheltering have on the book-tax
income gap. I find that GAAP changes, General Business Conditions and Earnings Management
explain 55.6% of the variation in the book-tax income gap. The results demonstrate that
attributing changes in the book-tax income gap exclusively to changes in tax sheltering behavior
dramatically overstates the extent of tax sheltering.
Section 2 provides institutional background on the book-tax income gap and motivates the
paper. Section 3 develops a simple model of the factors influencing the book-tax income gap and
outlines broad hypotheses. Section 4 describes the research design, including variable definitions
and sample specifics. Primary results and empirical extensions are reported in Sections 5 and 6,
respectively. Section 7 presents a number of robustness checks. Section 8 concludes and
suggests future research.
2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Exchange-traded firms in the United States are required to provide publicly available
quarterly and annual financial statements, prepared using Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP). GAAP refers to the body of standards promulgated by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The
FASB's goal, as outlined in various Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts, is to provide
information useful to investors and creditors in making decisions about the firm.
U.S. Corporations are also required to file annual income tax returns with the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), prepared following the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), which is passed
into law by Congress. Through income taxation, Congress raises funds to support governmental
operations in a way that it deems to be efficient and equitable. Congress also uses the Internal
Revenue Code to support a macroeconomic or public policy agenda-for example, encouraging
investments in renewable energy through tax credits and deterring corruption by disallowing
bribes as a deduction.
Because the financial statements and tax returns are prepared under separate regimes
whose governing bodies do not have identical objectives, natural differences exist between
income reported on financial statements and income reported on tax returns. While this
difference, the book-tax income gap, has long been interesting for its potential insights into the
tradeoffs between cash flow and reported income, the recent rise in the book-tax income gap has
garnered increased attention, both from the general public and from academics. Figure 1 depicts
my measure of the book-tax income gap for the period 1993-2004; Figure 2 is from Talisman
(1999) and shows the U.S. Treasury Department's measure of the gap for the period 1991-1996.
Despite using different measures of the book-tax income gap and different samples, these figures
show a strikingly similar pattern of increases in the book-tax income gap over the period 1993-
1996. Talisman (1999) cites this rise as evidence of increased tax sheltering.
[Insert Figures I and 2 around here]
In addition to attracting the attention of legislators, the rise in the book-tax income gap
also increased the interest of academics, resulting in a number of recent studies both on the book-
tax income gap itself and on effective tax rates, another measure sometimes used to gauge tax
sheltering. Two studies which confirm the rise in the book-tax gap using publicly available data
are Mills, Newberry and Trautman (2002) and Desai (2003). Mills, et al. (2002) show that the
gap increase occurs across most industries and that it has been driven by multinational firms.
Desai (2003) develops a model consistent with costly tax sheltering. His paper provides
analytical support for abusive tax shelters as a cause of the rise in the book-tax income gap.
Even as researchers were confirming that the book-tax income gap had increased and
legislators were debating the best approach to curb abusive tax shelters, the book-tax income gap
decreased. Figure 1 shows that the book-tax income gap was negative from 2000 to 2002.
Similar to increases, decreases in the book-tax income gap are also attributed to changes in tax
sheltering behavior. Yin (2001) attributes significant decreases in individual tax sheltering in the
late-1980's to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. One explanation for the recent decrease in the book-
tax income gap is that firms reduced tax sheltering behavior in anticipation of legislation.
However, the following anecdote suggests an alternative explanation.
For fiscal year 2002, AOL Time Warner Inc. (AOL) reported a Net Loss of $98.7 billion
dollars. Despite this massive book loss, AOL reported positive current federal tax expense,
indicating that it expected to have positive taxable income. A closer examination of their
financial statements shows that AOL was impacted by FASB Statement 142, which governs the
amortization and impairment of goodwill and other intangible assets. In 2002, AOL recorded
$99.8 billion of impairments related to SFAS 142; goodwill impairments are not deductible for
tax purposes.5 In the case of AOL, the large, negative book-tax income gap was caused by a
GAAP change, not by a change in tax sheltering behavior. This anecdote suggests that factors
other than tax sheltering affect the book-tax income gap.
A number of recent studies also suggest that alternative factors affect measures of tax
sheltering. Manzon and Plesko (2002) show that a relatively small set of financial statement
variables, including measures of Fixed and Intangible Assets and NOL Carryforwards, explain the
observed increase in the book-tax income gap. While Manzon and Plesko (2002) find that
accounting figures are extremely informative for the book-tax income gap, the interpretation of
their results is unclear since some of their financial statement variables proxy for incentives to
engage in tax sheltering. Hanlon (2005) finds that firms with small temporary book-tax
differences have more persistent book earnings than firms with large temporary book-tax
differences. Her results suggest that the calculation of book earnings affects temporary
differences, a component of the book-tax income gap. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) also
acknowledge that financial reporting affects the book-tax income gap. In a study on the
relationship between incentive compensation and tax sheltering, they interpret the portion of the
book-tax income gap unexplained by total accruals as tax sheltering. While they assume a
statistical association for their study, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) do not study the link between
5 Approximately $54 billion was recorded at implementation and is listed as a Cumulative Effect of Accounting
Change, rather than as an impairment, on the income statement and in Compustat.
financial reporting and the book-tax income gap. Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew (2006) study
long-run global effective tax rates, an alternative measure of tax sheltering behavior. They find
that tax avoidance (defined for their study as both legal tax planning and illegal tax avoidance) is
concentrated in a subset of corporations, suggesting that illegal tax avoidance may not be
widespread. Though the alternative factors are not specified, these papers suggest that factors
other than tax sheltering affect the book-tax income gap.
Increases and decreases in the book-tax income gap are largely attributed to changes in tax
sheltering behavior. The AOL anecdote above, along with a number of recent studies, suggest the
existence of alternative influences on the book-tax income gap. Below, I develop and test
hypotheses about factors other than tax sheltering which shape the gap. The primary hypothesis
of this paper is that factors not associated with tax sheltering behavior explain a non-trivial
portion of the book-tax gap.
3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
3.1. A Model of the Book-Tax Income Gap
The book-tax income gap is a function of factors affecting book and/or taxable income:
Accounting Rules (GAAP), Earnings Management Behavior (EM), Tax Law, Tax Sheltering
Behavior (Sheltering), and General Business Conditions (GBC).
Book-Tax Income Gap = f [GAAP, EM, Tax Law, Sheltering, GBC] (1)
Corporate tax law does not change significantly during the period 1993-2004. Thus, I do
not include measures of Tax Law in my tests.6 By its nature, tax sheltering is extremely difficult
6 While corporate tax law does not change significantly between 1993 and 2004, a number of provisions are
implemented which may affect the Book-Tax Income Gap. These include, but are not limited to, enacting tax
amortization for purchased intangible assets, creating check-the-box regulations for certain domestic and foreign
firms and increasing tax depreciation allowances for purchases around 9/11. Omitting these tax law changes
decreases the power of my tests and may result in my overstating the potential impact of tax sheltering.
to measure.7 Instead of attempting to measure Sheltering, this research focuses on demonstrating
that alternative factors contribute to the Book-Tax Income Gap. Removing Tax Law and
Sheltering, simplifies equation (1) to:
Book-Tax Income Gap = f [AGAAP, EM, GBC]8 + & (2)
My primary tests estimate equation (2). An extension of this model is developed in Section 6.1.
3.2. Hypotheses
3.2.1. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) govern how firms prepare and present
financial statements. GAAP is constantly evolving-on average, four FASB pronouncements are
issued every year during the period I study. These pronouncements may increase book income,
decrease book income, affect only the presentation and not the calculation of income items, or not
affect income items at all. Many changes in GAAP do not correspond to changes in tax law.
Therefore, changes to the GAAP calculation of book income affect the book-tax income gap. I
hypothesize that changes in GAAP significantly influence the book-tax income gap by affecting
book income but not taxable income.
H I: GAAP changes are informative for the book-tax income gap.
3.2.2. General Business Conditions
General Business Conditions (GBC) likely also affect the book-tax income gap.
Economic fluctuations affect the level of both book income and taxable income. For example, the
7 See McGill and Outslay (2004) for examples of instances where a thorough study of the financial statements
does and does not provide sufficient disclosure to uncover a tax shelter. Most research on tax shelters uses case
law or firm disclosures to uncover firms which the IRS has targeted for sheltering (see Graham and Tucker,
2006). The effectiveness of tax shelter measures based on electronically available data has not been
demonstrated.
8 I measure the effect of Accounting Rules as changes in these Rules. Therefore, I continue to calculate the book
earnings component of the Book-Tax Income Gap under the current GAAP regime but include variables which
proxy for the effect of shifts in this regime.
income level of many firms falls during recessionary times as consumers decrease spending.
Largely due to the accrual vs. transaction-driven nature of book vs. taxable income, it is unlikely
that these effects on book and taxable income are related such that the book-tax income gap would
be unaffected. General Business Conditions also influence business decisions, such as the amount
and type of investment and how to finance this investment, which also impact the book-tax
income gap. For example, lower interest rates may increase investment in long-term assets, which
will increase the book-tax income gap due to accelerated tax depreciation.
H2: General Business Conditions are informative for the book-tax income gap.
3.2.3. Earnings Management
Again due to the accrual vs. transaction-driven nature of book vs. taxable income, the
book-tax income gap is also affected by financial reporting behavior, including Earnings
Management (EM), which will generally be reversed for tax purposes.9 Firms have incentives to
"manage" their book income to smooth earnings as well as for opportunistic purposes. 1' In any
given period, these incentives may lead to either income-increasing or income-decreasing
Earnings Management. Additionally, the nature of most methods of "managing" earnings is
period-shifting, which suggests that any Earnings Management reverses within a few years." The
sustained increase in the book-tax income gap in the 1990's is inconsistent with the short-term
9 Certain accounts do exist where conformity is required (namely inventory, which requires conformity on the
FIFO-LIFO choice) and conformity increases for firms facing Alternative Minimum Taxes, but generally
accruals will be reversed for tax income. That firms may choose conformity (for example, to minimize the risk
of SEC detection, as in Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew, 2004) decreases the book-tax income gap and biases my
coefficients downwards.
to Subramanyam (1996) provides evidence consistent with earnings smoothing. Examples of opportunistic
Earnings Management include to maximize bonus payouts over time (Healy, 1985), to avoid violating debt
covenants (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994) and to meet or beat earnings targets (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997).
t For example, increasing net income by accruing lower expenses in one period will require the firm to accrue
higher expenses, and report lower net income, in some future period.
reversing nature generally believed of Earnings Management. However, the gap does decrease
during the period 2000-2002, consistent with a longer horizon reversal of Earnings Management.
H3: Earnings Management is informative for the book-tax income gap.
4. RESEARCH DESIGN
4.1. Variable Measurement
4.1.1. Dependent Variables
I follow Manzon and Plesko (2002) and define the U.S. Federal Book-Tax Income Gap
(BT_GAP) as BI - TI where:
BI = PRE-TAX - CUR_STATE - OTHER_TAX - EQUITY_SUBS
PRE-TAX = Domestic Pre-Tax Income (DATA272 if available, DATA 172 otherwise)
CUR_STATE = Income Taxes - State (DATA173), which are deductible for federal tax
OTHER_TAX = Income Taxes -Other (DATA211), which are deductible for federal tax
EQUITY_SUBS = Equity in Earnings (DATA55), which are not included in federal tax
TI = (CUR_FED/RATE)
CUR_FED = Income Taxes - Federal (DATA63)
RATE = maximum federal statutory rate obtained from www.irs.gov
While the correct measure of the book-tax income gap is found in IRS filings, the
Manzon-Plesko measure approximates the book-tax income gap reported on Form 1120 using
publicly available data. Hanlon and Shevlin (2002) demonstrate the importance of controlling for
the impact of non-qualified stock options when estimating the tax burden. A benefit of analyzing
the difference between book and tax income instead of book income and taxable income
separately is that the effect of stock options is removed.' 2 The book-tax income gap I calculate
12 As only two firms in the Compustat universe elected to expense stock options under SFAS 123, Domestic Pre-
Tax Income prior to the 2006 fiscal year filings does not include a stock option expense. The tax benefit from
the stock option tax deduction is not allowed as a benefit for Net Income purposes since the corresponding stock
option compensation is not recorded as an expense for Net Income purposes. Therefore, neither Book Income
nor current tax expense (used to calculate Taxable Income) has been reduced by stock option compensation and
the difference between the two is a clean measure with respect to the effect of option compensation. Manzon
and Plesko (2002) and Desai and Dharmapala (2006) provide additional discussion.
understates the true book-tax income gap found using IRS filings by the amount of the stock
option compensation deduction.
In extension tests in Section 6, I disaggregate BT_GAP into temporary and permanent
differences. Temporary and permanent differences are calculated from the income taxes
footnote. 13 Because I measure the book-tax income gap at the U.S. Federal level, ideal measures
of TEMP and PERM will only include federal differences. I define TEMP as Federal Deferred
Tax Expense, collected from the summary of taxes; positive (negative) TEMP indicates an
expense (benefit). This measure excludes deferred taxes due to jurisdictions other than the U.S.
Federal government. 14 TEMP is assumed to be zero for firms who disclose Federal Current Tax
Expense, which is needed to calculate TI, but do not disclose Federal Deferred Tax Expense.
Permanent differences are measured as federal permanent reconciling items. They are calculated
using the effective rate reconciliation and are denoted in dollars of tax. Specifically, PERM is
calculated as the dollar value of the statutory rate and of reconciling items not due to federal
permanent differences less the total tax provision; positive PERM indicates a decrease in the
U.S. Federal effective tax rate. I define reconciling items not due to federal permanent
differences as those due to foreign or state jurisdictions as well as due to differences between the
deferred effective rate and the statutory rate.15
13 I thank Jim Poterba, Jana Raedy and Doug Shackelford for use of the MIT-UNC tax footnote database.
14 Alternatively, I measure temporary differences as the change in the net deferred tax (asset)/liability. This
definition of TEMP is calculated from the summary of deferred tax position and is the change in both current
and noncurrent deferred taxes net of valuation allowance. Deferred taxes due to state and foreign jurisdictions
create measurement error in this definition of TEMP. In untabulated results, I find that this measure of TEMP
is more associated with the alternative factors I study. However, it is only related to BT_GAP at the 5%
significance level. When measured as the change in net deferred taxes, positive TEMP indicates an increasing
net deferred tax liability.
15 It is often assumed that all items disclosed in the rate reconciliation are permanent. This is true in many cases
simply because the effective rate on temporary items equals the statutory rate. When the effective rate on
temporary differences does not equal the statutory rate, disclosures for this rate difference are included in the
effective tax rate reconciliation. These instances include usage of unbenefited credits/carryforwards and other
valuation allowance changes as well as changes in tax rates or changes in accounting rules which lead to
revaluation of deferred taxes.
4.1.2. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles Variables
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles affect the calculation of book income but not
taxable income. Therefore, they affect the book-tax income gap. I study the effect of book
income calculation requirements on the book-tax income gap by studying changes to GAAP. In
doing so, I measure BI under the current GAAP regime and test variables which measure shifts in
this regime. I study four FASB Statements, all which became effective between 1993 and 2004.16
In this section, I define variables for the four GAAP changes; Table I summarizes these variables.
[Insert Table I around here]
SFAS 106, Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits, requires accrual of
postretirement benefits as they are earned. Like the book rules prior to SFAS 106, a tax deduction
is allowed for cash payments. This GAAP change will result in a temporary difference between
the accrual expense and the transaction-based tax deduction. I measure the effect of SFAS 106 as
AOPEB, the change in Postretirement Benefit Asset/(Liability) (DATA330).' 7
SFAS 121, Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived
Assets to be Disposed of, provides guidance for when impairments of long-lived assets should
occur. Riedl (2004) documents that impairments did occur prior to SFAS 121; the impact of
SFAS 121 is to provide uniform guidance for when these impairments should occur. Impairments
are not allowed under tax law; the effect of the impairment will be realized upon sale or disposal
through a different gain/(loss) for tax purposes. A temporary difference will exist from the time
of the impairment until sale.
16 1 include GAAP changes which I expect to be material, to have implications across many industries and to be
plausible to measure. Appendix A lists all nineteen FASB Statements of Accounting Standards effective
between 1993 and 2004 which affect the book-tax income gap and provides information as to their inclusion or
exclusion in this study.
17 Where missing, DATA330 is set to zero.
SFAS 144, Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets, provides a
unifying framework for impairments which includes business segments. While SFAS 144 does
not change most of the provisions of SFAS 121, SFAS 144 does remove goodwill from its scope.
I measure the effect of SFAS 121 and SFAS 144 together as IMPAIR, which is defined as:
1. Hand-collected asset and goodwill impairment data for years 1994-1999,18
2. Write-down After-tax (DATA381) plus Impairments of Goodwill After-tax
(DATA369) for years 2000-2001, and
3. Write-down After-tax (DATA381) for years 2002-2004.19
SFAS 142, Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets, replaces amortization with annual
testing of impairment for goodwill and other intangible assets without a specified finite life. Tax
law mandates amortization of purchased intangible assets over 15 years. When an intangible asset
is recorded for tax purposes, a temporary difference will exist for the difference between straight-
line 15-year tax depreciation and cumulative impairments. However, most corporate control
transactions are structured as tax-free reorganizations, which do not assign values to goodwill or
other purchased intangibles. Because no asset is recorded for tax purposes, amortization expense
will not be recorded for tax purposes. In the event of a tax-free reorganization, SFAS 142 will
lead to permanent differences throughout the life of the book asset. I measure the effect of SFAS
142 on both goodwill and non-goodwill intangibles. I define GW_IMPAIR as Impairments of
Goodwill After-tax (DATA369) for 2002-2004. Because goodwill impairments are included in
IMPAIR through 2002, GW_IMPAIR is zero for years 1994-2001. I measure the effect of
SFAS 142 on non-goodwill intangibles as AINTANG (change in (DATA33-DATA204)). Prior
to 2002, the change in non-goodwill intangibles will be affected by amortization instead of
impairments. To capture only the effect of SFAS 142, AINTANG is zero for years 1994-2001.
18 I thank Eddie Riedl and Suraj Srinivasan for sharing their 1992-2002 impairment data with me. Firm-years
prior to 2000 which do not match the hand-collected impairment data are not included in the sample.
19 Where DATA381 or DATA369 are missing and the year is 2000 or later, they are set to zero.
4.1.3. General Business Conditions Variables
General Business Conditions shape the book-tax gap both by directly affecting the levels of
income and by influencing investment decisions. First, GBC impact the current levels of both book
and taxable income. However, book and taxable income will not be equally affected, due primarily
to different revenue and expense recognition rules. Thereby, GBC impact the book-tax income gap.
I measure the direct effect of General Business Conditions on the book-tax income gap as
the industry-standardized change in Net Sales. I first calculate the change in Net Sales (DATA I2)
for each firm, then average annually at the 3-digit SIC code to get the industry-averaged rate of
change in Net Sales. I multiply this rate by firm-level lagged Net Sales to create the variable
ASALES. Though the industry-standardized change in Net Sales largely impacts the book-tax
income gap through temporary differences, situations may occur where permanent differences are
impacted. Income level affects ability to use credits and carryforwards, which are permanent
difference items. For example, the base for the Research & Development (R&D) credit uses current
period sales. As current period sales increase, the allowable R&D credit will decrease, holding
R&D spending constant. One example of the relationship between ASALES and TEMP is working
capital accruals. Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998) model the impact of sales shocks on certain
working capital accruals, such as Accounts Receivable. Sales growth causes most accruals to
increase. For example, Accounts Receivable increases due to a lag between revenue recognition
and cash collections. Because many accruals are reversed in the calculation of taxable income,
accruals impact temporary differences.
Second, General Business Conditions affect firms' current investment decisions. These
decisions include where to invest, in which projects to invest, and how to finance the investment.
I include two variables that are intended to assess a firm's exposure to General Business
Conditions which influence current decisions. First, I include a variable designed to measure the
"cost" of financing, which I measure as the cost of financing with external debt. This cost of
financing measure gauges the ease with which the firm can make investments. 20 I calculate the
cost of financing with external debt (COST_DEBT) as the industry-standardized annual interest
expense. Specifically, I calculate the interest rate for each firm and then average annually at the
3-digit SIC code, where interest rate is Interest Expense (DATA 15) divided by average interest-
bearing debt (DATA9+DATA34). I then multiply this rate by the firm's average interest-bearing
debt.2 Because different types of investments create either temporary or permanent differences,
COST_DEBT potentially impacts the book-tax income gap through both TEMP and PERM.22
General Business Conditions may affect the decision about which investment to
undertake. The decision set of potential investments includes other firms, intangible assets or
tangible assets. These assets impact the book-tax income gap because of different
depreciation/amortization or impairment rules. I focus on the book-tax gap impact of tangible
assets. To measure the book-tax gap impact of tangible long-term asset investments, I first
calculate the annual capital expenditure rate for each firm as Property, Plant, and Equipment -
Capital Expenditures (DATA30) divided by beginning Gross Assets (DATA7) and average this
rate annually for each 3-digit SIC code. I then multiply this rate by firm beginning Gross Assets
to generate the variable CAP_EX. 23 Tangible long-term asset investments will increase the book-
tax gap through a temporary difference due to accelerated tax depreciation.
4.1.4. Earnings Management Variables
20 The impact of many investments occurs through different methods of expensing capital assets. Higher levels
of investment will lead to higher depreciation expense or higher potential impairments. Therefore, higher levels
of investment have a greater impact on the book-tax income gap.
21 Where DATAI5 is missing, I set it equal to zero.
22 For example, investments in other firms may create permanent differences, while investments in long-term
assets create temporary* differences. As COST_DEBT proxies for the ease at which a firm may make
investments without specifying which type of investments, it is unclear which channel this variable works
through.
23 Where DATA30 is missing, I set it equal to zero; this occurs for 8.9% of the observations.
Earnings Management affects the book-tax income gap by affecting book income.
Because taxable income is largely calculated on a transaction-basis, Earnings Management does
not affect taxable income.24 For example, a firm may record a higher compensation expense than
is needed to smooth its earnings. The salary and wage deduction for tax purposes is based on cash
payments, not on accounting expense. Therefore, the increased book expense does not affect
taxable income. The recognition and subsequent reversal of accruals recorded for Earnings
Management purposes will create temporary differences.
Following a long line of literature, including Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), I
calculate discretionary accruals to measure EM. Because the modified Jones model has been
shown to systematically misestimate discretionary accruals in times of growth or decline, I use the
standard Jones model, calculated at the industry level (i.e., Dechow, Kothari and Watts, 1998).25 I
calculate the industry-average rate of normal accruals to assets using coefficients estimated from
model (6) for each 3-digit SIC code industry over the period 1992-2004:
ACCit = a*l/TAit+ t 1ARevit + 02PPEit + 6 (3)
Where the variables are defined as:
ACCit = (Earnings before Extraordinary Items (DATA123) - CFOit)/ TAit
TAit = Total Assets (DATA6)
ARevit = Change in Sales (DATA12)/ TAit
PPEit = Gross PP&E (DATA7)/ TAit
I calculate each firm's normal accruals by applying this industry rate to firm Total Assets.
Discretionary accruals (D_ACC), which measures the effect of Earnings Management on the
book-tax income gap, is calculated as the difference between actual and normal accruals.
24 Earnings Management generally occurs through accruals rather than through transactions. Most accruals will
be reversed for taxable income due to the generally transaction-based nature of taxable income. Certain accounts
do exist where conformity is required (namely inventory, which requires conformity on the FIFO-LIFO choice)
and these reversals will not occur. That firms may choose conformity (for example, to minimize the risk of SEC
detection, as in Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew, 2004) biases against finding results.
25 I do not use performance-matched accruals as suggested by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), because my
sample is not an extreme performance sample where discretionary accrual misspecification is most likely.
Performance-matched accruals are superior when the research design postulates that the sample is more likely to
have engaged in Earnings Management than the control firms.
4.2. Fundamental Assumption
An assumption which underlies each of the three hypotheses is that the alternative factor
being examined is uncorrelated with tax sheltering behavior. This assumption is more reasonable
for some of my alternative factors than for other factors. I believe the assumption that GAAP
changes are uncorrelated with tax sheltering is valid. It is difficult to construct a scenario where
an exogenous GAAP change results in a change in tax sheltering behavior, which aims to decrease
taxable income without affecting book income. To test this assumption, I regress the GAAP
changes I study on leading taxable income both one and two years forward. I find no significance
on any of the GAAP changes in either regression, which supports this assumption.
However, both General Business Conditions and Earnings Management may be correlated
with Tax Sheltering. In times of prosperity, a firm may have stronger incentives to engage in tax
sheltering behavior because they have more income to shelter. Assuming shelters obtain savings as
a percentage of earnings, General Business Conditions may be positively correlated with Tax
Sheltering. Alternatively, in times of low income when each dollar of income is highly valued,
incentives to shelter may increase. This scenario assumes that shelters obtain fixed savings and
suggests a negative correlation between General Business Conditions and Tax Sheltering. To
mitigate potential correlation, I calculate rates for GBC variables at the Industry level. I calculate
firm-level variables and then average them annually at the 3-digit SIC code level.26 The
industry rate is then applied to firm-level figures to scale the variables to dollars, comparable
with the GAAP Change variables. All Compustat firm-year observations are included in the
industry averages, regardless of whether the firm-year observation has the necessary variables
to be included in the final sample. While using firm-level numbers to scale the variables may
26 An alternative design would average the source variables and then calculate General Business Conditions
using the Industry means. This approach size-weights the variables. Because size has been shown to be
correlated with tax sheltering (see Lisowsky, 2008), I avoid weighting the General Business Condition variables.
introduce some correlation, I believe calculating GBC variables at the industry level removes most
of the potential correlation with tax sheltering because the firm characteristics shown to be related
to tax sheltering will vary within industry. For example, Lisowsky (2008) finds that the probability
of a tax shelter is increasing in the financial complexity of a firm and the percent of income which is
foreign. Both of these characteristics vary within industry. In Section 7.1., I scale all GBC
variables using the industry average instead of scaling by firm-specific figures. While General
Business Condition results are weaker using industry-scaled variables, it is difficult to determine
whether this is because the industry-scaled variables are weaker proxies with less variation or
whether firm-scaled variables are correlated with tax sheltering. I explore this further in Section
7.1. by using industry-averaged GAAP change variables; nearly all explanatory power is lost when
all firm-specific information is removed. These results suggest that significant results found when
scaling by General Business Condition variables with firm-specific data are due to additional
variation and power in the data, rather than due to correlation with tax sheltering.
Frank, Lynch and Rego (2006) find a positive correlation between measures of aggressive
financial reporting and aggressive tax reporting. Using a two-stage least squares methodology,
they find that firms who are aggressive for financial purposes also tend to be aggressive for tax
purposes but that firms who are aggressive for tax purposes are less aggressive for financial
purposes. While the results in Frank et al. (2006) are somewhat difficult to interpret, they do
suggest that the assumption of orthogonality between Earnings Management and Tax Sheltering
may not be valid. To address this concern, in Section 7.2., I replicate my primary analyses
without my measure of Earnings Management, D_ACC. Results are unchanged, suggesting the
assumption is valid with respect to Earnings Management.
4.3. Primary Sample Selection
To test my hypotheses, I use all domestic non-subsidiary firms in Compustat. Table 2
summarizes the sample selection. Many firms do not separately disclose Federal Current Tax
Expense and therefore do not have the data necessary to calculate the book-tax income gap. The
ASALES calculation requires lagged Net Sales and therefore drops the first observation of each
firm. Requiring impairment data for SFAS 121 (IMPAIR) also reduces the sample because
impairment data is only electronically available after 2000. IMPAIR is populated for some firm-
years prior to 2000 because I use the Riedl (2004) and Riedl and Srinivasan (2007) samples, but
these samples do not cover the entire Compustat universe. My final sample includes 30,423 firm-
year observations over 7902 firms.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
4.4. Descriptive Statistics and Summary Correlations
Panel A of Table 3 presents summary statistics and a correlation table for the primary
sample. Though the sign and magnitude of many independent variables are as expected, there are
a few unexpected statistics. The mean and median book-tax income gap, BT_GAP, is negative
for the sample as a whole. When calculated annually, the mean (median) BT_GAP is negative
only during the years 2000-2002 (2000-2004). The electronic availability of IMPAIR in these
later years allows these years to contribute a disproportionate number of observations to the
sample, leading to a negative mean (median) BT_GAP for the sample as a whole. The mean
(median) AOPEB is negative (zero). While the implied goal of SFAS 106 is to decrease OPEB
liabilities by encouraging firms to fund their OPEB responsibilities, this indicates an increasing
OPEB liability. IMPAIR and GW_IMPAIR are negative by construction. These variables are
zero for a large portion of the sample; only 14% (2%) of firm-year observations have a non-zero
value for IMPAIR (GW_IMPAIR). Riedl (2004) finds that a long-term asset or goodwill
impairment is recorded in approximately 16% of his randomly selected firm-year observations,
relatively consistent with the findings for my similarly measured SFAS 121 and SFAS 140
variable, IMPAIR. The small number of firm-year observations for GW_IMPAIR is not
surprising because prior to the implementation of SFAS 142, goodwill impairments are dictated
by SFAS 121. To avoid double-counting goodwill impairments, I set GW_IMPAIR equal to
zero for years prior to the implementation of SFAS 142 in 2002. Due to similar treatment prior to
2002 of my other measure of SFAS 142, the change in non-goodwill intangible assets, I find that
CHG_INTANG is zero for approximately 25% of the sample and is negative at the mean.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
Panel B of Table 3 presents correlations and significance levels when the Pearson
correlations are significant at the 10% level. Some correlation exists amongst my variables; 17 of
the 28 pair-wise correlations are significant at the 10% level. Even though some correlations are
statistically significant, few are significant in magnitude. Only six statistically significant
correlations have a correlation coefficient greater than 0.10.
4.5. Summary of Predictions
I list my variables and predictions in Table 4. Column 2 presents predictions for my
primary tests, while columns 3 and 4 refer to the extension tests in Section 6. I expect all
variables except COST_DEBT to be positively related to the book-tax income gap, BT_GAP.
This is because increases in the cost of investing will decrease investments and the tax-book
depreciation gap. Because I expect temporary and permanent differences to be positively related
to BT_GAP, I predict similarly signed relationships between my independent variables and
TEMP and PERM as I do with BT_GAP. While all explanatory variables are expected to
impact temporary differences, I expect that certain GAAP change variables, CAP_EX and
D_ACC only affect temporary differences.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1. Multivariate Results
Table 5 presents the regression of explanatory variables on the book-tax income gap
outlined in equation (2).27 As expected, IMPAIR, GW_IMPAIR and CAP_EX are positively
and significantly related to BT_GAP. COST_DEBT is also positively and significantly related
to BT_GAP, contrary to expectations, though the coefficient is close to zero. D_ACC is
significantly related to BT_GAP, but the coefficient is essentially zero.
The results on IMPAIR and GW_IMPAIR suggest that FASB statements related to
impairment decreased the book-tax income gap, mitigating the effect of factors which may have
increased the book-tax income gap. I expect a coefficient of 1.0 on all GAAP change variables;
the significant coefficients reported in Table 5 are reasonably close to 1.0. Both CAP_EX and
COST_DEBT increase BT_GAP. The results imply that the book-tax income gap would have
been smaller absent these General Business Conditions. The evidence in Table 5 demonstrates
that factors other than tax sheltering affect the book-tax income gap.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
In addition to demonstrating that factors other than tax sheltering affect the book-tax
income gap in an economically significant way, Table 5 also shows that these factors explain a
27 I acknowledge an omitted variable, tax sheltering. The goal of tax sheltering is to decrease taxable income
without affecting book income, creating a positive book-tax income gap. Therefore, I do not expect this omitted
variable to be mean zero. Primary results are estimated without an intercept to address this issue. In Section
7.2., I present regressions with an intercept to address concerns that excluding the intercept overstates the R2.
significant portion of the variation in the book-tax income gap. Table 5 reports an R2 of 59.99%,
suggesting that the limited set of variables I include explain a large percentage of the variation in
the book-tax income gap. This result does allow for tax sheltering to explain approximately 40%
of the variation in the book-tax income gap. However, I include variables for only four of the
nineteen GAAP changes; a model with controls for all GAAP changes would result in an even
higher R2. When omitted variables are considered, this result casts doubt on the potential effect
tax sheltering may have on the book-tax income gap.
5.2. Separate Factor Tests
To determine which explanatory variables are most informative for the book-tax income
gap, and to more directly test the hypotheses of this paper, I estimate the equation in Table 5
separately for each variable type. Specifically, I separately regress GAAP changes, General
Business Conditions, and Earnings Management on BT_GAP.28 Panel A of Table 6 presents the
R2 for these three regressions. GAAP changes contribute nearly all of the explanatory power,
with an R of 54.56%. This result strongly supports HI. While the GBC and EM variables
provide incremental explanatory power to the GAAP changes, their explanatory power
individually is fairly small. The R2 of GBC and EM variables on BT_GAP is approximately
2.6% and 1.2%, respectively. These results weakly support H2 and H3. Overall, I find that
alternative factors explain a significant portion of the book-tax income gap. This explanatory
power is driven by changes to the GAAP accounting calculation of book income.
[Insert Table 6 around here]
28 I acknowledge that incremental R2 is the most appropriate measure, given that R2s are not generally additive
due to correlation amongst variables. Untabulated results of incremental R2 are similar.
6. EMPIRICAL EXTENSION
6.1. Extension of Model
Mechanically, the book-tax income gap can be generally separated into temporary and
permanent differences:
Book-Tax Income Gap = Temporary differences + Permanent differences 29  (4)
In addition to estimating equation (2), I explore whether the factors above influence the
book-tax income gap through temporary or permanent differences. While GAAP, Tax Law, and
GBC can affect either temporary or permanent differences, EM and Sheltering work largely
through only one avenue. Earnings Management primarily affects temporary differences because
the nature of most methods of "managing" earnings is period-shifting which reverses in the near
future. Tax sheltering primarily affects permanent differences because tax sheltering strives to
permanently reduce taxes rather than to simply delay payment of tax. 30 Combining equations (1)
and (4) as described above, and again removing Tax Law and Sheltering, yields the following
system of equations:
Book-Tax Income Gap = f [Temporary differences, Permanent differences] (5a)
where Temporary differences = f [AGAAP, EM, GBC] + e (5b)
and Permanent differences = f [AGAAP, GBC] + F (5c)
I obtain the Federal deferred tax expense to measure Temporary differences and federal
permanent rate reconciliation items to proxy for Permanent differences. In extension tests, I
disaggregate the Book-Tax Income Gap to focus on Permanent differences, the portion of the
Book-Tax Income Gap most likely affected by tax sheltering.
29Temporary differences arise when accounting rules and tax rules treat an income or an expense item similarly
but differ on when the component of income is recognized. Some examples of temporary differences include
bonuses earned but not yet paid and the difference between tax and book methods of depreciation. Permanent
differences arise when accounting rules and tax rules treat components of income in different ways. Permanent
differences include such items as tax-exempt income, which is included in accounting earnings but is not
taxable, and penalties, which are an accounting expense but are not deductible for tax purposes.
30 McGill and Outslay (2004) quote a Joint Committee on Taxation report as defining a tax shelter an
arrangement that is "reasonably expected to create a 'permanent difference' for U.S. financial reporting purposes
under generally accepted accounting principles."
6.2. Extension Sample
To test my hypotheses, I use the sample in Poterba, Rao and Seidman (2008). This
sample provides the necessary data to calculate TEMP and PERM for the disaggregation of
BT_GAP. The Poterba, et al. (2008) sample covers all firms in the FORTUNE 50 firms between
1995 and 2004 and firms involved in merger or acquisition activity with these firms during the
sample period. Firm-year observations are matched with COMPUSTAT on firm name and year;
the match is validated using total assets and net income. The sample includes 2340 firm-years
covering 403 firms, of which 2176 firm-years (327 firms) have the data necessary to calculate the
book-tax income gap and 1053 firm-years (212 firms) have all the data necessary for regressions.
Panel A of Table 7 presents summary statistics for the extension sample; Panel B presents
a correlation table. As Panel A shows, the extension sample contains larger and more profitable
firms than does the primary sample. This is by construction, given that I begin with the Poterba,
et al. (2008) sample to create the extension sample. Despite dropping a considerable number of
firms due to data availability, I expect that my sample comprises a large proportion of the book-
tax income gap because large firms account for approximately 90% of the book-tax income gap
(Mills, et al., 2002). In fact, the mean and median book-tax income gap in the extension sample
are positive while these figures are negative in the primary sample. Panel B shows that
correlation is even less of an issue in the extension sample; only nine of the twenty-eight pair-wise
correlations are significant at the 10% level.
[Insert Table 7 around here]
6.3. Extension Results
As specified in equation (4), the book-tax income gap can be separated into temporary and
permanent differences. While equation (4) is an identity theoretically, all three variables likely
contain measurement error. However, the variable construction is such that the measurement
error in BT_GAP should not include the collective measurement error in TEMP and PERM.
Table 8 reports the results of estimating equation (4). Regressing BT_GAP on TEMP and
PERM achieves an R2 of 69.51%. As expected, both TEMP and PERM are positively and
significantly related to BT_GAP. While the relatively high R2 suggests that TEMP and PERM
are significantly related to BT_GAP, the fact that it is not closer 100% confirms that the identity
in equation (4) does not hold in my sample. 31
[Insert Table 8 around here]
TEMP and PERM likely contain measurement error due to firms' disclosure choices.
TEMP contains measurement error primarily for firms which do not separately disclose a Federal
Deferred Tax Expense.32 I assume that the Federal Deferred Tax Expense is zero for these firms.
While this is the best assumption available, it is likely not true. Firms not separately disclosing
Federal Deferred Tax Expense generally disclose a nonzero Domestic (Federal and State)
Deferred Tax Expense or Total (including Foreign) Deferred Tax Expense which likely include
Federal Deferred Tax Expense.33 My measure of PERM assumes that all reconciling items
categorized by the firm as 'Other', as well as all reconciling items which occur so infrequently
that they are noncategorizable, are current federal reconciling items. To the extent that
reconciling items caused by non-federal jurisdictions or caused by temporary differences are
included in the rate reconciliation categories, these items will not be properly excluded from my
measure of PERM. Due to this, PERM contains measurement error.
31 In addition to the measurement error, TEMP and PERM are measured in dollars of tax while BT_GAP is
measured in dollars of income. While this will not affect the R2, it does affect the coefficient. This measurement
difference leads to a prediction of 2.86 (1.0 / 0.35) instead of the 1.0 implied by equation (4).
32 One hundred and sixty-five firms in my sample do not separately disclose Federal Deferred Tax Expense.
33 Alternatively, I assume that TEMP equals Total Deferred Tax Expense for firms not reporting Federal
Deferred Tax Expense. Under this alternative definition, TEMP contains measurement error because it includes
state, local and foreign deferred tax expense. Using this measure of TEMP, I find coefficients and R2 virtually
identical to those reported in Table 8. The results in Table 9 also remain nearly unchanged.
BT_GAP contains measurement error from two sources. First, I estimate taxable income
from financial statement data. Because CUR_STATE and OTHER_TAX are calculated using
the accrual method but only cash taxes paid are allowed as a tax deduction, TI contains
measurement error. Also, to the extent that I assume U.S. Pre-Tax Income equals Total Pre-Tax
Income for firms who do not separately disclose U.S. Pre-Tax Income, BI contains measurement
error. I search the 10-Ks for the 645 firm-year observations missing U.S. Pre-Tax income in
Compustat and collect this variable for 117 firm-year observations.34 The assumption that U.S.
Pre-Tax Income equals Total Pre-Tax Income appears reasonable for the remaining firms because
the majority of firms without separate domestic and foreign disclosures are expected to have
immaterial foreign operations (i.e., U.S. retailers, U.S. power companies.)
While BT_GAP contains some measurement error, I believe the best test of the effect of
my hypothesized factors on BT_GAP is the direct test, as in Table 5. An alternative research
design would be to jointly estimate the effects on TEMP and PERM and interpret the summed
results. Given the measurement error in TEMP and PERM and the hand-collection required to
calculate both TEMP and PERM, the direct test is a better design. I estimate the disaggregated
regressions on TEMP and PERM because the disaggregated regression of alternative factors on
PERM offers additional insight into the impact of tax sheltering on the book-tax income gap.
Though not a direct test of my primary hypotheses, these regressions are still informative.
Because tax sheltering primarily affects permanent differences, the R2 of the regression of
explanatory variables on PERM allows us to better interpret the R2 of the primary regression of
explanatory variables on BT_GAP presented in Table 5. A low R2 on the disaggregated
regression on PERM suggests that relatively more of the variation in the book-tax income gap
34 The instances where I find a disclosure that Compustat didn't collect seem to occur for two reasons. First,
Compustat adjusts the disclosed Pre-Tax Income from the Income Statement for Minority Interest, causing the
disclosed Foreign/Domestic Pre-Tax break-out to differ from what Compustat records as DATA 172. Second,
the disclosure occurs in Segment disclosures instead of in the Income Taxes footnote. Due to the size of the
primary sample, I am unable to perform this check for the entire sample.
may be caused by tax sheltering. Due to measurement error in all three dependent variables as
well as to different samples, the coefficients estimated jointly in Table 9 will not sum to the
coefficients estimated directly in Table 5.
[Insert Table 9 around here]
Panel A of Table 9 presents the regression of explanatory variables on TEMP as outlined
in equation (5b). As predicted, Industry Average Capital Expenditures (CAP_EX) increase
BT_GAP. Unexpectedly, the effect of SFAS 106 (AOPEB) increases the book-tax income gap.
Both the cost of debt (COSTDEBT) and Earnings Management (D_ACC) are significantly
related to temporary differences but their coefficients are essentially zero. Overall, the factors I
study offer relatively little explanatory power for temporary differences.
Panel B of Table 9 presents the regression of explanatory variables on PERM as outlined
in equation (5c). As expected, I find a positive and significant coefficient on both GW_IMPAIR
and AINTANG. This, along with the insignificance of these SFAS 142 variables in the regression
on TEMP, implies that firms in my sample engaged in more tax-free reorganizations than taxable
reorganizations. COST_DEBT is also positively related to the book-tax income gap, indicating a
positive relationship between the cost of external financing and permanent differences. The R2 of
the regression is quite high (65.8%) indicating that the included variables explain the variation in
permanent differences well. This strong result allows for significantly less tax sheltering through
permanent differences than through temporary differences. As tax sheltering is primarily
expected to create permanent differences, this provides additional challenge for the belief that tax
sheltering was a primary cause of the recent rise in the book-tax income gap.
Overall, these disaggregated regressions offer some support for my conjectures about
which channels the explanatory variables work through. In addition, the results show that the
alternative factors I study explain a large percentage of the variation in permanent differences.
This suggests that the variation in BT_GAP that can be attributed to tax sheltering is even less
than the unexplained R2 presented in Table 5.
7. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
7.1. Alternative Variable Calculations
As discussed in Section 4.2., General Business Conditions may be correlated with Tax
Sheltering. To reduce correlation, I calculate rates for GBC variables at the industry level.
However, to scale the GBC variables similar to the GAAP Change Variables, I multiply the
industry-averaged rate with a firm-specific value. This use of firm-specific information may
introduce unwanted correlation. As a robustness check, I scale the industry-averaged rates using
industry-averaged values. Specifically, I calculate ASALES as industry-averaged percent
change in Net Sales times industry-averaged lagged Net Sales, COST_DEBT as industry-
averaged interest rate time industry-averaged average interest-bearing debt, and CAP_EX as
industry-average capital expenditure rate times industry-averaged Gross Property, Plant and
Equipment; industry-average rates are defined in Section 4.1.3. All industry-averaging is
performed annually at the 3-digit SIC code.
Panel A of Table 10 replicates Table 5, replacing firm-scaled GBC variables with
industry-scaled variables. While CAP_EX remains significant, COST_DEBT becomes
insignificant. The R2 of the regression falls from nearly 60% to 56%. In untabulated results, I
separately test industry-scaled GBC variables and find an R2 of 0.4%. Contrary to the
separate firm-scaled GBC R2 of 2.62% presented in Table 6, industry-scaled GBC variables
offer essentially no explanatory power for the book-tax income gap.
[Insert Table 10 around here]
It is difficult to determine whether the significance found using firm-scaled GBC variables
is due to increased power in the firm-scaled variables or whether the firm-specific variables used
to scale are correlated with tax sheltering. To provide a benchmark for the power lost when firm-
specific values are replaced by industry-averaged values, I annually average each of the four
GAAP change variables as the 3-digit SIC code.
Panel B of Table 10 replicates Table 5, replacing firm-specific GAAP Change variables
with industry-averaged variables. While IMPAIR remains significant, GW_IMPAIR loses
significance. The R2 falls from nearly 60% to less than 5%. In untabulated results, I separately
test industry-averaged GAAP Change variables and find that they offer an R2 of only 0.83%,
significantly less than the separate firm-specific GAAP Change R2 of 54.56% in Table 6.
The alternative variable calculation methods presented in Table 10 provide comfort
that results found using firm-scaled GBC variables are due to the powerful variation in firm-
scaled variables rather than due to correlation with tax sheltering induced by the scaling
method. Both industry-averaged GAAP Change variables and industry-scaled GBC variables
provide only 1.5% of the explanatory power as their firm-specific or firm-scaled counterparts.
7.2 Exclusion of Earnings Management variable
Frank, Lynch and Rego (2006) suggest that aggressive tax and financial reporting may be
related. To address this concern, I exclude my Earnings Management variable, D_ACC, in Table
11. As suggested by the non-result in Table 6 and the minimal correlation presented in Panel B of
Table 3, excluding D_ACC does not change the results. In fact, coefficients and significance on
all GAAP change variables are nearly identical as those reported in Table 5.
[Insert Table 11 around here]
7.3. Inclusion of Intercept
In my primary regressions, I do not include an intercept because I acknowledge tax
sheltering as an omitted variable which is likely not mean zero. Excluding the intercept does not
force the residuals to be mean zero and so addresses this problem. However, excluding the
intercept may cause the R2 to be overstated because it assumes the mean of the dependent
variable, a component in the calculation of R2, is zero. To test whether my R2 is biased upwards
in Table 5, I estimate the regression in Table 5 but include the intercept. Table 12 presents these
results. In addition to generating the same R2 as the regression without an intercept, the regression
including an intercept reports nearly identical coefficients and significance of all variables as well.
The concern that excluding the intercept overstates the R2 is unfounded in this setting.
[Insert Table 12 around here]
7.4. Implementation impact of GAAP changes
GAAP changes have both an implementation effect and an ongoing effect on book
income. For example, SFAS 106 had a large negative impact on net income in the year of
implementation. To confirm that the results I obtain are driven by the ongoing effect of the
GAAP accounting changes instead of the implementation impact, I delete all observations which
may have used the year of implementation to calculate the variable.35 To remove the
implementation effect of SFAS 106, I exclude the 1994 observations as well as those from 1993
which have a fiscal year end between December and May and those from 1995 which have a
fiscal year end between June and November; 1594 observations are removed. I estimate my
35 The variable definitions for SFAS 121, SFAS 142 and SFAS 144 use income statement data. Because the
implementation impact will be categorized as a Cumulative Effect of Accounting Change, this effect is
automatically excluded in the variable calculation. As such, I do not perform robustness checks on the
implementation impact of these three GAAP changes.
primary regressions on this reduced sample to remove the implementation effect of SFAS 106.
Table 13 presents these results, which are statistically similar to the results in Table 5.
[Insert Table 13 around here]
7.5. Disaggregating the Effects of SFAS 121 and SFAS 144
The GAAP change variable IMPAIR includes the effect of both SFAS 121 and SFAS
144, statements which are both primarily related to write-downs of tangible long-term assets. To
determine the impact of each Statement separately, I disaggregate IMPAIR. I create two separate
variables: IMPAIR121, which is defined as hand-collected goodwill and long-term asset
impairment data prior to 2000, Write-down After-tax (DATA381) for 2000-2001 and Impairment
of Goodwill After-tax (DATA369) for 2000-2001; and IMPAIR144, which is Write-down After-
tax (DATA381) for 2002-2004.
Table 14 reports the results replacing IMPAIR with both IMPAIR121 and IMPAIR144.
As Table 14 shows, the significance of IMPAIR in the primary regression is driven by the effect
of SFAS 121. When separated, long-term asset impairments under SFAS 121 remain significant.
However, long-term tangible asset impairments under SFAS 144 are no longer significant at the
10% level. This is consistent with the significance observed on SFAS 142, the Statement which
superseded SFAS 121 regarding goodwill impairments. It appears that impairments related to
goodwill offer more explanatory power for the book-tax income gap better than impairments
related to long-term tangible assets.
[Insert Table 14 around here]
7.6. Industry Tests
The magnitude of the book-tax gap likely differs across industry. This is due in part to
industry-specific credits (for example, Research and Development credits are less likely in
financial firms) and the effect of the book-tax depreciation gap, which will be related to the size of
both the stock of and the current period investment in long-term tangible assets. To determine
whether industries are differentially subject to the effects of GAAP changes, General Business
Conditions and Earnings Management, I perform the tests in Table 5 using industry groupings.
Panel A of Table 15 reports the adjusted R2s from the regressions by industry.36 I follow
the US Department of Labor's SIC Manual and group firms into 10 broad industries.37 I find an
adjusted R2 greater than 50% for five industries; all industries report an adjusted R2 of at least
10%. In untabulated results, the effects of GAAP changes drive the R2 in most industries.
However, I find that the Mining industry is relatively more affected by General Business
Conditions than are the other industries and Wholesale Trade is almost exclusively affected by
Earnings Management. While certain industries are more subject to the effects of GAAP changes,
General Business Conditions and Earnings Management than other industries, nearly all firms in
my sample are largely affected by these factors.
[Insert Table 15 around here]
7.7. Weighted Tests
Evidence suggests that large firms are more often the target of IRS scrutiny regarding tax
sheltering behavior.38 Whether this is because larger firms more often engage in tax sheltering or
because the IRS targets firms which have more potential impact on revenues is unclear. Ex ante,
one might expect large firms to be less involved in tax sheltering for a number of reasons. Large
firms are generally subject to continuous IRS audits. They are also often subject to higher
36 I report adjusted R2 here, inconsistent with the rest of the paper. I do this to adjust for the disparate sample
sizes across industries.
37 Because my industry GBC variables are calculated at the 3-digit SIC and these industry groupings are broader,
industry GBC variables are included in these tests.
18 Mills (1998) shows that IRS audit adjustments are increasing in book-tax differences. Larger firms are more
likely to have large book-tax differences, as Mills, et al. (2002) shows.
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scrutiny from analysts, institutional investors, and the media in general, relative to small firms.
However, there are reasons why large firms may be more likely to be involved in tax sheltering.
First, they pay relatively more tax dollars and so have more savings to realize. Second, they may
have the additional financial flexibility, such as international operations, to achieve certain tax
shelters. Finally, tax shelters are more likely to be marketed to large firms because the expected
payment for services is larger. To determine whether my results are driven by large firms with
large book-tax income gaps, I perform firm-size weighted regressions. If large firms are more
often engaged in tax sheltering, I expect to find a lower R2 when weighting by firm-size.
Panel B of Table 15 reports the R2s from regressions weighted by firm-size. To proxy for
firm-size, I alternatively weight on Total Assets (DATA6), Net Sales (DATA12), and MVE
(DATA 199*DATA25.) In all specifications, the resulting R2 is lower than the equal-weight
results presented in Table 5. These results suggest that the alternative factors I study are
somewhat less explanatory for larger firms, consistent with tax sheltering being more prevalent
among large firms. However, all R2s achieve at least 40%, providing evidence that the alternative
factors I study continue to offer significant explanatory power.
8. CONCLUSION
I provide evidence that variables not associated with tax sheltering explain a significant
portion of the variation in the book-tax income gap. Specifically, I show that proxies for the
effect of certain GAAP changes effective between 1993 and 2002 explain nearly 55% of the
variation in the book-tax income gap during the period 1994-2004. The total explanatory power
of the four GAAP changes I include plus variables designed to measure General Business
Conditions and Earnings Management is approximately 60% of the total variation. Extension
tests show that the unexplained variation in the permanent component of the book-tax income
gap, the portion of the book-tax income gap at which tax sheltering is aimed, is even less than the
unexplained variation in the book-tax income gap as a whole. These results suggest that the book-
tax income gap is a much noisier measure of tax sheltering than previously thought. In the likely
circumstance that the variable of interest is correlated with general business conditions, the book-
tax income gap may be a particularly inappropriate proxy for tax sheltering.
Additionally, my tests suggest that factors other than tax sheltering affect the level of the
book-tax income gap. General Business Conditions and Earnings Management increase the book-
tax income gap, exacerbating the effect of other increasing factors such as tax sheltering and legal
tax minimization. GAAP changes mitigate the effect of these increases-absent the four GAAP
changes I study, the book-tax income gap would have been even larger. These results suggest that
tax sheltering is a less important influence on the book-tax income gap than previously believed
and that attributing changes in the book-tax income gap exclusively to changes in tax sheltering
behavior is erroneous.
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Source data: Compustat, 1993-2004
Book Income = Domestic Pre-Tax Income - CUR_STATE - OTHER_TAX - EQUITY_SUBS
Tax Income = CUR_FED/RATE
Unbalanced panel of 35,511 firm-years, where panel is created as in Table 2 and ranges from 520
(1996) to 6819 (2000) observations
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Source data: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, 1991-1996
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TABLE 1: Summary of GAAP Variables
FASB Effective New Book Tax Treatment Variable Definition
Statement Date Treatment
SFAS 106 Fiscal years Accrual is A deduction is AOPEB = change in
Employers' beginning required as allowed for cash Postretirement Benefit
Accounting for after benefits are payments. Liability/(Asset)
Postretirement 12/15/1992 earned. (DATA330)39
Benefits
SFAS 121 Fiscal years SFAS 121 Impairments are not IMPAIR = hand-
Accounting for beginning provides deductible for tax collected impairment
the Impairment after uniform purposes. The effect data prior to 2000;
of Long-Lived 12/15/1995 guidance for of impairment will be Write-down After-tax
Assets and for when realized upon sale or plus Impairments of
Long-Lived impairment of disposal through a Goodwill After-tax
Assets to be long-lived smaller gain/(larger (DATA381 +
Disposed Of assets should loss) for tax. DATA369) for 2000-
occur and be 200124
included in NI.
SFAS 142 Goodwill Intangible Intangible assets GW_IMPAIR =
Goodwill and and assets without acquired in a taxable Impairments of
Other intangible a specified merger are amortized Goodwill After-tax
Intangible assets finite life are over 15 years.40  (DATA369) for 2002-
Assets acquired tested for 2004; AINTANG =
after impairment change in non-
06/30/2001 annually. goodwill intangibles =
change in (DATA33-
DATA204) for 2002-
200424
SFAS 144 Fiscal years SFAS 144 Impairments are not IMPAIR = Write-
Accounting for beginning includes deductible for tax down After-tax
the Impairment after business purposes. The effect (DATA381) for 2002-
or Disposal of 12/15/2001 segments in of impairment will be 200424
Long-Lived the framework realized upon sale or
Assets it outlines, disposal through a
smaller gain/(larger
loss) for tax.
39 Where DATA330 is missing, I set it equal to zero. Where DATA381 or DATA369 are missing and the year is
2000 or later, I set them equal to zero.
40 Most mergers are structured to be tax-free. Tax-free mergers do not allow value to be assigned to purchased
intangibles. Therefore, no amortization occurs.
TABLE 2
Sample Selection
Compustat firms with Total Assets, 1993-2004 103,097
Less: BT_GAP 27,935
Less: Missing explanatory variables
ASALES 5,830
COST_DEBT 65
CAP_EX 1,072
D_ACC 1,701
IMPAIR 33,469
Observations in primary regressions 30,423
Not included in Poterba, Rao and Seidman (2008) sample 29,392
Less: missing PERM 5
Observations in extension regressions 1,026
Variable Definitions (Compustat data item in parentheses, where applicable):
BT_GAP = Domestic Pre-tax Income - Federal Taxable Income (272 - [(63 /statutory
rate) - 173 - 211 - 55])
= industry rate of change in Net Sales (12), averaged annually by 3-digit SIC,
ASALES times firm-specific lagged Net Sales
COST_DEBT = industry-averaged annual interest rate times firm-specific average interest-
bearing debt (9 + 34), where interest rate is Interest Expense (15) divided by
average interest-bearing debt
CAP_EX = industry-averaged capital expenditure rate times firm-specific Gross
Property, Plant, and Equipment (7), where capital expenditure rate is
Property, Plant, and Equipment - Capital Expenditures (30) / Gross Property,
Plant, and Equipment
D_ACC = Actual Accruals - Normal Accruals, where the Normal Accrual-to-Asset rate
is calculated annually using the standard Jones Model at the 3-digit SIC level
and applied to firm-specific Total Assets (6)
IMPAIR = hand-collected long-term asset and goodwill impairment data prior to 2000,
Write-down After-tax and Impairments of Goodwill After-tax 2000-2001 (381 +
369), and Write-down After-tax for 2002-2004 (381), proxies for effects of
SFAS 121 and SFAS 144
PERM = [(pretax income*disclosed statutory rate-reconciling items due to foreign or
state jurisdictions-reconciling items due to temporary differences) - total tax
expense]
TABLE 3
Summary Statistics and Correlation Table
(30,423 firm-year observations, 1993-2004)
Panel A: Summary Statistics (millions of dollars)
Mean Median Std. Dev.
Dependent Variables
G BT_GAP
GAAP Change Variables
-2.89 -0.972 599 -10.5 4.49
AOPEB -2.18 0.00 133 0.00 0.00
IMPAIR -9.53 0.00 310 0.00 0.00
GW_IMPAIR -3.96 0.00 208 0.00 0.00
AINTANG -14.9 0.00 1,014 0.00 0.00
Industry General Business Condition Variables
ASALES 2,518 31.6 60,794 1.96 213
COST_DEBT 232 2.10 7,648 0.129 23.8
CAP_EX 48.3 1.89 284 0.270 12.1
Earnings Management Variable
ID_ACC -1,931 1 0.212 1321,604 1 -10.2 1 12.4
Firm Characteristics
TOTAL ASSETS (DATA6) 3,479 153 27,271 24.2 790
NET INCOME (DATA172) 56.7 0.416 963 -6.74 25.7
Variable Definitions (Compustat data item in parentheses, where applicable):
BT_GAP = Domestic Pre-tax Income - Federal Taxable Income
173- 211 - 55])
AOPEB
IMPAIR
GW_IMPAIR
AINTANG
ASALES
COST_DEBT
CAP_EX
D_ACC
(272 - [(63/statutory rate) -
= change in Postretirement Benefit Asset/(Liability) (330), proxies for effect of
SFAS 106
= hand-collected long-term asset and goodwill impairment data .prior to 2000,
Write-down After-tax and Impairments of Goodwill After-tax 2000-2001 (381 +
369), and Write-down After-tax for 2002-2004 (381), proxies for effects of SFAS
121 and SFAS 144
= Impairment of Goodwill After-tax (369) for 2002-2004, 0 otherwise, proxies for
effect of SFAS 142
= Change in non-goodwill intangibles (33 -204), proxies for effect of SFAS 142
= industry rate of change in Net Sales (12), averaged annually by 3-digit SIC,
times firm-specific lagged Net Sales
= industry-averaged annual interest rate times firm-specific average interest-
bearing debt (9 + 34), where interest rate is Interest Expense (15) divided by
average interest-bearing debt
= industry-averaged capital expenditure rate times firm-specific Gross Property,
Plant, and Equipment (7), where capital expenditure rate is Property, Plant, and
Equipment -Capital Expenditures (30) / Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment
= Actual Accruals - Normal Accruals, where the Normal Accrual-to-Asset rate is
calculated annually using the standard Jones Model at the 3-digit SIC level and
applied to firm-specific Total Assets (6)
P25 P75
TABLE 3
Summary Statistics and Correlation Table
(30,423 firm-year observations, 1993-2004)
Panel B: Significant Pair-wise Pearson Correlations
AOPEB
IMPAIR
GW IMPAIR
AINTANG
ASALES
COSTDEBT
CAPEX
D ACC
AOPEB
IMPAIR
GW_IMPAIR
AINTANG
ASALES
COST_DEBT
CAPEX
D ACC
AOPEB IMPAIR GW IMPAIR
1.000
0.613
0.000
-0.024
0.000
AINTANG ASALES COST DEBT
1.000
0.269
0.000
-0.114
0.000
CAP EX DACC
= change in Postretirement Benefit Asset/(Liability) (330), proxies for effect of SFAS 106
= hand-collected long-term asset and goodwill impairment data prior to 2000, Write-down After-tax and Impairments of Goodwill
After-tax 2000-2001 (381 + 369), and Write-down After-tax for 2002-2004 (381), proxies for effects of SFAS 121 and SFAS 144
= Impairment of Goodwill After-tax (369) for 2002-2004, 0 otherwise, proxies for effect of SFAS 142
= Change in non-goodwill intangibles (33 - 204), proxies for effect of SFAS 142
= industry rate of change in Net Sales (12), averaged annually by 3-digit SIC, times firm-specific lagged Net Sales
= industry-averaged annual interest rate times firm-specific average interest-bearing debt (9 + 34), where interest rate is Interest
Expense (15) divided by average interest-bearing debt
= industry-averaged capital expenditure rate times firm-specific Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment (7), where capital
expenditure rate is Property, Plant, and Equipment - Capital Expenditures (30) / Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment
= Actual Accruals - Normal Accruals, where the Normal Accrual-to-Asset rate is calculated annually using the standard Jones
Model at the 3-digit SIC level and applied to firm-specific Total Assets (6)
1.000
0.010
0.081
-0.015
0.012
-0.019
0.001
0.010
0.071
-0.083
0.000
0.013
0.025
1.000
0.047
0.000
0.040
0.000
-0.077
0.000
1.000
-0.048
0.000
1.000
0.226
0.000
0.134
0.000
1.000
-0.102
0.000
1.000
I
TABLE 4
Summary of Predictions
predicted effect
on BT_GAP
predicted effect
on TEMP*
predicted effect
on PERM*
GAAP Change Variables
AOPEB + + N/A
IMPAIR + + N/A
GW IMPAIR + + +
AINTANG + + +
Industry General Business Condition Variables
ASALES + + +
COST_ DEBT ?
CAP_EX + + N/A
Earnings Management Variable
ID_ACC + + N/A
* Prediction for extension tests only.
Variable Definitions (Compustat data item in parentheses, where applicable):
BT_GAP = Domestic Pre-tax Income - Federal Taxable Income (272
173- 211 - 55])
TEMP = federal deferred tax expense
PERM
AOPEB
IMPAIR
GW_IMPAIR
AINTANG
ASALES
COST_DEBT
CAP_EX
D_ACC
- [(63/statutory rate) -
= [(pretax income*disclosed statutory rate-reconciling items due to foreign or
state jurisdictions-reconciling items due to temporary differences) - total tax
expense]
= change in Postretirement Benefit Asset/(Liability) (330), proxies for effect of
SFAS 106
= hand-collected long-term asset and goodwill impairment data prior to 2000,
Write-down After-tax and Impairments of Goodwill After-tax 2000-2001 (381 +
369), and Write-down After-tax for 2002-2004 (381), proxies for effects of SFAS
121 and SFAS 144
= Impairment of Goodwill After-tax (369) for 2002-2004, 0 otherwise, proxies for
effect of SFAS 142
= Change in non-goodwill intangibles (33 - 204), proxies for effect of SFAS 142
= industry rate of change in Net Sales (12), averaged annually by 3-digit SIC,
times firm-specific lagged Net Sales
= industry-averaged annual interest rate times firm-specific average interest-
bearing debt (9 + 34), where interest rate is Interest Expense (15) divided by
average interest-bearing debt
= industry-averaged capital expenditure rate times firm-specific Gross Property,
Plant, and Equipment (7), where capital expenditure rate is Property, Plant, and
Equipment -Capital Expenditures (30) / Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment
= Actual Accruals - Normal Accruals, where the Normal Accrual-to-Asset rate is
calculated annually using the standard Jones Model at the 3-digit SIC level and
applied to firm-specific Total Assets (6)
TABLE 5
Effect of Alternative Factors on the Book-Tax Income Gap
(30,423 firm-year observations, 1993-2004)
BT_GAP =f (AOPEB, IMPAIR, GW_IMPAIR, AINTANG,
ASALES, COST_DEBT, CAP_EX, D_ACC, E)
pred Coef. Std. Error P>z
GAAP Change Variables
AOPEB + -0.038 0.100 0.70
IMPAIR + 1.089 0.045 0.00
GW IMPAIR + 1.233 0.152 0.00
AINTANG + 0.041 0.031 0.19
Industry General Business Condition Variables
ASALES + 0.000 0.000 0.26
COST_DEBT - 0.002 0.001 0.07
CAP_EX + 0.403 0.073 0.00
Earnings Management Variable
ID ACC + 0.000 0.000 0.00
R-squared 59.99%
Statistical significance in OLS regression determined using White standard errors.
Variable Definitions (Compustat data item in parentheses, where applicable):
BT_GAP = Domestic Pre-tax Income - Federal Taxable Income (272
173- 211 - 55])
AOPEB
IMPAIR
GW_IMPAIR
AINTANG
ASALES
COST_DEBT
CAP_EX
D_ACC
- [(63/statutory rate) -
= change in Postretirement Benefit Asset/(Liability) (330), proxies for effect of
SFAS 106
= hand-collected long-term asset and goodwill impairment data prior to 2000,
Write-down After-tax and Impairments of Goodwill After-tax 2000-2001 (381 +
369), and Write-down After-tax for 2002-2004 (381), proxies for effects of SFAS
121 and SFAS 144
= Impairment of Goodwill After-tax (369) for 2002-2004, 0 otherwise, proxies for
effect of SFAS 142
= Change in non-goodwill intangibles (33 -204), proxies for effect of SFAS 142
= industry rate of change in Net Sales (12), averaged annually by 3-digit SIC,
times firm-specific lagged Net Sales
= industry-averaged annual interest rate times firm-specific average interest-
bearing debt (9 + 34), where interest rate is Interest Expense (15) divided by
average interest-bearing debt
= industry-averaged capital expenditure rate times firm-specific Gross Property,
Plant, and Equipment (7), where capital expenditure rate is Property, Plant, and
Equipment -Capital Expenditures (30) / Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment
= Actual Accruals - Normal Accruals, where the Normal Accrual-to-Asset rate is
calculated annually using the standard Jones Model at the 3-digit SIC level and
applied to firm-specific Total Assets (6)
TABLE 6
Effect of Alternative Factors on the Book-Tax Income Gap, By Factor
R-squared
GAAP Change Variables 54.56%
Industry General Business Condition Variables 2.62%
Earnings Management Variable 1.24%
GAAP Change, Industry GBC, and EM Variables 59.99%
n= 30,423
GAAP Change Variables BT_GAP = f (AOPEB, IMPAIR, GW_IMPAIR, AINTANG, c)
Industry General Business BT_GAP = f (ASALES,COST DEBT, CAPEX, E)Condition Variables
Earnings Management Variable BT_GAP =f(D_ACC, E)
Variable Definitions (Compustat data item in parentheses, where applicable):
BT_GAP = Domestic Pre-tax Income - Federal Taxable Income (272 -
[(63/statutory rate) - 173 - 211 - 55])
AOPEB = change in Postretirement Benefit Asset/(Liability) (330), proxies
for effect of SFAS 106
IMPAIR = hand-collected long-term asset and goodwill impairment data
prior to 2000, Write-down After-tax and Impairments of Goodwill
After-tax 2000-2001 (381 + 369), and Write-down After-tax for
2002-2004 (381), proxies for effects of SFAS 121 and SFAS 144
GW_IMPAIR = Impairment of Goodwill After-tax (369) for 2002-2004, 0
otherwise, proxies for effect of SFAS 142
AINTANG = Change in non-goodwill intangibles (33 - 204), proxies for effect
of SFAS 142
ASALES = industry rate of change in Net Sales (12), averaged annually by 3-
digit SIC, times firm-specific lagged Net Sales
COST_DEBT = industry-averaged annual interest rate times firm-specific
average interest-bearing debt (9 + 34), where interest rate is
Interest Expense (15) divided by average interest-bearing debt
CAP_EX = industry-averaged capital expenditure rate times firm-specific
Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment (7), where capital
expenditure rate is Property, Plant, and Equipment - Capital
Expenditures (30) / Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment
D_ACC = Actual Accruals - Normal Accruals, where the Normal Accrual-to-
Asset rate is calculated annually using the standard Jones Model
at the 3-digit SIC level and applied to firm-specific Total Assets (6)
TABLE 7
Summary Statistics and Correlation Table
(1026 firm-year observations, 1993-2004)
Panel A: Summary Statistics (millions of dollars)
Mean Median Std. Dev. P25 P75
Dependent Variables
BT GAP 258 34.9 2,186 -80.7 442
TEMP 12.3 0.592 599 -11.8 43.0
PERM 69.7 0.464 472 -21.0 110
GAAP Change Variables
AOPEB -37.5 0.00 711 -15.8 1.00
IMPAIR -67.2 0.00 343 0.000 0.00
GW IMPAIR -39.2 0.00 911 0.000 0.00
AINTANG -178 0.00 4,660 0.000 0.00
Industry General Business Condition Variables
ASALES 28,303 2,091 223,947 283 8,936
COST_DEBT 3,967 264 40,025 26.1 793
CAP EX 610 195 1,239 11.4 571
Earnings Management Variable
ID_ACC -55,6731 26 11,750,9341 -200 749
Firm Characteristics
TOTAL ASSETS (DATA6) 57,349 16,104 127,006 3,620 42,382
NET INCOME (DATA172) 1,177 481 4,216 26.1 1,783
Variable Definitions (Compustat data item in parentheses, where applicable):
BT_GAP = Domestic Pre-tax Income - Federal Taxable Income (272 - [(63/statutory rate) -
173- 211 - 55])
TEMP = federal deferred tax expense
PERM = (pretax income*disclosed statutory rate-reconciling items due to foreign or
state jurisdictions-reconciling items due to temporary differences) - total tax
expense
AOPEB = change in Postretirement Benefit Asset/(Liability) (330), proxies for effect of
SFAS 106
IMPAIR = hand-collected long-term asset and goodwill impairment data prior to 2000,
Write-down After-tax and Impairments of Goodwill After-tax 2000-2001 (381 +
369), and Write-down After-tax for 2002-2004 (381), proxies for effects of SFAS
121 and SFAS 144
GW_IMPAIR = Impairment of Goodwill After-tax (369) for 2002-2004, 0 otherwise, proxies for
effect of SFAS 142
AINTANG = Change in non-goodwill intangibles (33 - 204), proxies for effect of SFAS 142
ASALES = industry rate of change in Net Sales (12), averaged annually by 3-digit SIC,
times firm-specific lagged Net Sales
COST_DEBT = industry-averaged annual interest rate times firm-specific average interest-
bearing debt (9 + 34), where interest rate is Interest Expense (15) divided by
average interest-bearing debt
CAP_EX = industry-averaged capital expenditure rate times firm-specific Gross Property,
Plant, and Equipment (7), where capital expenditure rate is Property, Plant, and
Equipment -Capital Expenditures (30) / Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment
D_ACC = Actual Accruals - Normal Accruals, where the Normal Accrual-to-Asset rate is
calculated annually using the standard Jones Model at the 3-digit SIC level and
applied to firm-specific Total Assets (6)
TABLE 7
Summary Statistics and Correlation Table
(1026 firm-year observations, 1993-2004)
Panel B: Significant Pair-wise Pearson Correlations
AOPEB
IMPAIR
GWIMPAIR
AINTANG
ASALES
COSTDEBT
CAPEX
D ACC
AOPEB
IMPAIR
GWIMPAIR
AINTANG
ASALES
COST_DEBT
CAP_EX
DACC
AOPEB IMPAIR GW IMPAIR
1.000
0.831
0.000
AINTANG ASALES COST DEBT
1.000
0.288
0.000
-0.116
0.000
CAP EX D ACC
= change in Postretirement Benefit Asset/(Liability) (330), proxies for effect of SFAS 106
= hand-collected long-term asset and goodwill impairment data prior to 2000, Write-down After-tax and Impairments of Goodwill
After-tax 2000-2001 (381 + 369), and Write-down After-tax for 2002-2004 (381), proxies for effects of SFAS 121 and SFAS 144
= Impairment of Goodwill After-tax (369) for 2002-2004, 0 otherwise, proxies for effect of SFAS 142
= Change in non-goodwill intangibles (33 - 204), proxies for effect of SFAS 142
= industry rate of change in Net Sales (12), averaged annually by 3-digit SIC, times firm-specific lagged Net Sales
= industry-averaged annual interest rate times firm-specific average interest-bearing debt (9 + 34), where interest rate is Interest
Expense (15) divided by average interest-bearing debt
= industry-averaged capital expenditure rate times firm-specific Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment (7), where capital
expenditure rate is Property, Plant, and Equipment - Capital Expenditures (30) / Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment
= Actual Accruals - Normal Accruals, where the Normal Accrual-to-Asset rate is calculated annually using the standard Jones
Model at the 3-digit SIC level and applied to firm-specific Total Assets (6)
1.000
-0.074
0.018
1.000
0.062
0.047
-0.245
0.000
1.000
1.000
0.334
0.000
0.172
0.000
1.000
-0.113
0.000
1.000
I
TABLE 8
Disaggregated Regressions of the Components of the Book-Tax Income Gap
(1026 firm-year observations, 1993-2004)
BT_GAP=f (TEMP, PERM)
pred Coef. Std. Error P>z
TEMP + 2.315 0.412 0.00
PERM + 2.059 0.367 0.00
R-squared 69.51%
Variable Definitions (Compustat data item in parentheses, where applicable):
BT_GAP = Domestic Pre-tax Income - Federal Taxable Income (272 - [(63/statutory rate) -
173- 211 - 55])
TEMP = federal deferred tax expense
PERM = (pretax income*disclosed statutory rate-reconciling items due to foreign or state
jurisdictions-reconciling items due to temporary differences) - total tax expense
TABLE 9
Effect of Alternative Factors on the Components of the Book-Tax Income Gap
Disaggregated regressions (1026 firm-year observations, 1993-2004)
Panel A: Regression on TEMP
TEMP= f (AOPEB, IMPAIR, GW_IMPAIR, AINTANG,
ASALES, COST_DEBT, CAPEX, D_ACC, E)
pred Coef. Std. Error P>z
GAAP Change Variables
AOPEB + -0.054 0.019 0.01
IMPAIR + 0.028 0.041 0.50
GW_IMPAIR + 0.041 0.028 0.14
AINTANG + -0.006 0.005 0.24
Industry General Business Condition Variables
ASALES + 0.000 0.000 0.44
COST_DEBT - 0.001 0.000 0.09
CAP_EX + 0.087 0.011 0.00
Earnings Management Variable
D_ACC + 0.000 I o0.000 1 0.03
R-squared 11.96%
Panel B: Regression on PERM
PERM =f (GW_IMPAIR, AINTANG, ASALES, COST_DEBT, E)
pred Coef. Std. Error P>z
GAAP Change Variables
GWIMPAIR + 0.498 0.020 0.00
AINTANG + 0.007 0.004 0.06
Industry General Business Condition Variables
ASALES I + 0.000 0.000 0.59
COST DEBTI ? 0.001 0.000 0.00
R-squared 65.82%
Variable Definitions (Compustat data item in parentheses, where applicable):
TEMP
PERM
AOPEB
IMPAIR
GW_IMPAIR
AINTANG
ASALES
COSTDEBT
CAP_EX
D_ACC
= federal deferred tax expense
= (pretax income*disclosed statutory rate-reconciling items due to foreign or state
jurisdictions-reconciling items due to temporary differences) - total tax expense
= change in Postretirement Benefit Asset/(Liability) (330), proxies for effect of SFAS
106
= hand-collected long-term asset and goodwill impairment data prior to 2000, Write-
down After-tax and Impairments of Goodwill After-tax 2000-2001 (381 + 369), and
Write-down After-tax for 2002-2004 (381), proxies for effects of SFAS 121 and
SFAS 144
= Impairment of Goodwill After-tax (369) for 2002-2004, 0 otherwise, proxies for
effect of SFAS 142
= Change in non-goodwill intangibles (33 - 204), proxies for effect of SFAS 142
= industry rate of change in Net Sales (12), averaged annually by 3-digit SIC, times
firm-specific lagged Net Sales
= industry-averaged annual interest rate times firm-specific average interest-bearing
debt (9 + 34), where interest rate is Interest Expense (15) divided by average
interest-bearing debt
= industry-averaged capital expenditure rate times firm-specific Gross Property,
Plant, and Equipment (7), where capital expenditure rate is Property, Plant, and
Equipment - Capital Expenditures (30) / Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment
= Actual Accruals - Normal Accruals, where the Normal Accrual-to-Asset rate is
calculated annually using the standard Jones Model at the 3-digit SIC level and
applied to firm-specific Total Assets (6)
TABLE 10
Effect of Alternative Factors on the Book-Tax Income Gap, Alternative Variable Calculations
(30,423 firm-year observations, 1993-2004)
BT_GAP =f (AOPEB, IMPAIR, GW_IMPAIR, AINTANG,
ASALES, COST_DEBT, CAP_EX, D_ACC, E)
Panel A: Industry-scaled General Business Condition Variables
pred Coef. Std. Error P>z
GAAP Change Variables
AOPEB + -0.103 0.141 0.47
IMPAIR + 1.062 0.063 0.00
GW IMPAIR + 1.240 0.157 0.00
AINTANG + 0.036 0.031 0.26
Industry General Business Condition Variables
ASALES + 0.000 0.000 0.26
COST_DEBT 0.008 0.007 0.23
CAP_EX + 0.345 0.070 0.00
Earnings Management Variable
D_ACC + 0.000 0.000 0.00
R-squared 56.06%
Statistical significance in OLS regression determined using White standard errors.
Variable Definitions (Compustat data item in parentheses, where applicable):
BT_GAP
AOPEB
IMPAIR
GW_IMPAIR
AINTANG
ASALES
COST_DEBT
CAP_EX
D_ACC
= Domestic Pre-tax Income - Federal Taxable Income (272 - [(63/statutory rate) -
173- 211 - 55])
= change in Postretirement Benefit Asset/(Liability) (330), proxies for effect of
SFAS 106
= hand-collected long-term asset and goodwill impairment data prior to 2000,
Write-down After-tax and Impairments of Goodwill After-tax 2000-2001 (381 +
369), and Write-down After-tax for 2002-2004 (381), proxies for effects of SFAS
121 and SFAS 144
= Impairment of Goodwill After-tax (369) for 2002-2004, 0 otherwise, proxies for
effect of SFAS 142
= Change in non-goodwill intangibles (33 -204), proxies for effect of SFAS 142
= industry rate of change in Net Sales (12), averaged annually by 3-digit SIC,
times industry-averaged lagged Net Sales
= industry-averaged annual interest rate times industry-averaged average
interest-bearing debt (9+34), where interest rate is Interest Expense (15) divided
by average interest-bearing debt
= industry-averaged capital expenditure rate times industry-averaged Gross
Property, Plant, and Equipment (7), where capital expenditure rate is Property,
Plant, and Equipment - Capital Expenditures (30) / Gross Property, Plant, and
Equipment
= Actual Accruals - Normal Accruals, where the Normal Accrual-to-Asset rate is
calculated annually using the standard Jones Model at the 3-digit SIC level and
applied to industry-averaged Total Assets (6)
TABLE 10
Effect of Alternative Factors on the Book-Tax Income Gap, Alternative Variable Calculations
(30,423 firm-year observations, 1993-2004)
BT_GAP =f (AOPEB, IMPAIR, GW_IMPAIR, AINTANG,
ASALES, COST_DEBT, CAP_EX, D_ACC, E)
Panel B: Industry-averaged GAAP Change Variables
pred Coef. Std. Error P>z
GAAP Change Variables
AOPEB + 0.282 0.650 0.67
IMPAIR + 1.575 0.742 0.03
GW IMPAIR + 2.249 1.509 0.14
AINTANG + 0.202 0.190 0.29
Industry General Business Condition Variables
ASALES + 0.000 0.000 0.20
COST_DEBT - 0.003 0.001 0.02
CAP_EX + 0.290 0.065 0.00
Earnings Management Variable
[D_ACC + 0I .000 0.000 0.00
R-squared 4.69%
Statistical significance in OLS regression determined using White standard errors.
Variable Definitions (Compustat data item in parentheses, where applicable):
BT_GAP
AOPEB
IMPAIR
GWIMPAIR
AINTANG
ASALES
COSTDEBT
CAP_EX
D_ACC
= Domestic Pre-tax Income - Federal Taxable Income (272 - [(63/statutory rate) -
173- 211 - 55])
= industry-averaged change in Postretirement Benefit Asset/(Liability) (330),
averaged annually by 3-digit SIC, proxies for effect of SFAS 106
= industry-averaged hand-collected long-term asset and goodwill impairment
data prior to 2000, Write-down After-tax and Impairments of Goodwill After-tax
2000-2001 (381 + 369), and Write-down After-tax for 2002-2004 (381), proxies
for effects of SFAS 121 and SFAS 144
= industry-averaged Impairment of Goodwill After-tax (369) for 2002-2004, 0
otherwise, proxies for effect of SFAS 142
= industry-averaged change in non-goodwill intangibles (33 - 204), proxies for
effect of SFAS 142
= industry rate of change in Net Sales (12) times firm-specific lagged Net Sales
= industry-averaged annual interest rate times firm-specific average interest-
bearing debt (9 + 34), where interest rate is Interest Expense (15) divided by
average interest-bearing debt
= industry-averaged capital expenditure rate times firm-specific Gross Property,
Plant, and Equipment (7), where capital expenditure rate is Property, Plant, and
Equipment -Capital Expenditures (30) / Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment
= Actual Accruals - Normal Accruals, where the Normal Accrual-to-Asset rate is
calculated annually using the standard Jones Model at the 3-digit SIC level and
applied to firm-specific Total Assets (6)
TABLE 11
Effect of Alternative Factors on the Book-Tax Income Gap, omitting Earnings Management
(30,423 firm-year observations, 1993-2004)
BT_GAP =f (AOPEB, IMPAIR, GW_IMPAIR, AINTANG,
ASALES, COST_DEBT, CAP_EX, E)
pred Coef. Std. Error P>z
GAAP Change Variables
AOPEB + -0.041 0.099 0.68
IMPAIR + 1.089 0.045 0.00
GW_IMPAIR + 1.232 0.152 0.00
AINTANG + 0.042 0.031 0.18
Industry General Business Condition Variables
ASALES + 0.000 0.000 0.41
COST_DEBT - 0.003 0.002 0.11
CAP_EX + 0.418 0.074 0.00
R-squared 59.21%
Statistical significance in OLS regression determined using White standard errors.
Variable Definitions (Compustat data item in parentheses, where applicable):
BT_GAP = Domestic Pre-tax Income - Federal Taxable Income (272
173- 211 - 55])
AOPEB
IMPAIR
GW_IMPAIR
AINTANG
ASALES
COST_DEBT
CAP_EX
- [(63/statutory rate) -
= change in Postretirement Benefit Asset/(Liability) (330), proxies for effect of
SFAS 106
= hand-collected long-term asset and goodwill impairment data prior to 2000,
Write-down After-tax and Impairments of Goodwill After-tax 2000-2001 (381 +
369), and Write-down After-tax for 2002-2004 (381), proxies for effects of SFAS
121 and SFAS 144
= Impairment of Goodwill After-tax (369) for 2002-2004, 0 otherwise, proxies for
effect of SFAS 142
= Change in non-goodwill intangibles (33 -204), proxies for effect of SFAS 142
= industry rate of change in Net Sales (12), averaged annually by 3-digit SIC,
times firm-specific lagged Net Sales
= industry-averaged annual interest rate times firm-specific average interest-
bearing debt (9 + 34), where interest rate is Interest Expense (15) divided by
average interest-bearing debt
= industry-averaged capital expenditure rate times firm-specific Gross Property,
Plant, and Equipment (7), where capital expenditure rate is Property, Plant, and
Equipment - Capital Expenditures (30) / Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment
TABLE 12
Effect of Alternative Factors on the Book-Tax Income Gap, including intercept
(30,423 firm-year observations, 1993-2004)
BT_GAP =f (a, AOPEB, IMPAIR, GW_IMPAIR, AINTANG,
ASALES, COST_DEBT, CAP_EX, D_ACC, E)
pred Coef. Std. Error P>z
GAAP Change Variables
AOPEB + -0.038 0.099 0.70
IMPAIR + 1.088 0.046 0.00
GW_IMPAIR + 1.233 0.152 0.00
AINTANG + 0.041 0.031 0.19
Industry General Business Condition Variables
ASALES + 0.000 0.000 0.24
COST_DEBT 0.002 0.001 0.08
CAP_EX + 0.408 0.074 0.00
Earnings Management Variable
ID_ACC + 0.000 0.000 0.00
constant + -7.951 2.893 0.01
R-squared - 60.00%
Statistical significance in OLS regression determined using White standard errors.
Variable Definitions (Compustat data item in parentheses, where applicable):
BT_GAP = Domestic Pre-tax Income - Federal Taxable Income (272
173- 211 - 55])
AOPEB
IMPAIR
GW_IMPAIR
AINTANG
ASALES
COST_DEBT
CAP_EX
D_ACC
- [(63/statutory rate) -
= change in Postretirement Benefit Asset/(Liability) (330), proxies for effect of
SFAS 106
= hand-collected long-term asset and goodwill impairment data prior to 2000,
Write-down After-tax and Impairments of Goodwill After-tax 2000-2001 (381 +
369), and Write-down After-tax for 2002-2004 (381), proxies for effects of SFAS
121 and SFAS 144
= Impairment of Goodwill After-tax (369) for 2002-2004, 0 otherwise, proxies for
effect of SFAS 142
= Change in non-goodwill intangibles (33 - 204), proxies for effect of SFAS 142
= industry rate of change in Net Sales (12), averaged annually by 3-digit SIC,
times firm-specific lagged Net Sales
= industry-averaged annual interest rate times firm-specific average interest-
bearing debt (9 + 34), where interest rate is Interest Expense (15) divided by
average interest-bearing debt
= industry-averaged capital expenditure rate times firm-specific Gross Property,
Plant, and Equipment (7), where capital expenditure rate is Property, Plant, and
Equipment - Capital Expenditures (30) / Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment
= Actual Accruals - Normal Accruals, where the Normal Accrual-to-Asset rate is
calculated annually using the standard Jones Model at the 3-digit SIC level and
applied to firm-specific Total Assets (6)
TABLE 13
Effect of Alternative Factors on the Book-Tax Income Gap, excluding SFAS 106 adoption
(28,931 firm-year observations, 1993-2004)
BT_GAP =f (AOPEB, IMPAIR, GW_IMPAIR, AINTANG,
ASALES, COST_DEBT, CAP_EX, D_ACC, E)
pred Coef. Std. Error P>z .
GAAP Change Variables
AOPEB + 0.012 0.125 0.92
IMPAIR + 1.089 0.045 0.00
GW_IMPAIR + 1.233 0.152 0.00
AINTANG + 0.041 0.031 0.18
Industry General Business Condition Variables
ASALES + 0.000 0.000 0.26
COST_DEBT - 0.002 0.001 0.08
CAP_EX + 0.414 0.076 0.00
Earnings Management Variable
ID_ACC + 0.000 0.000 0.00
R-squared 60.42%
Statistical significance in OLS regression determined using White standard errors.
Variable Definitions (Compustat data item in parentheses, where applicable):
AOPEB
IMPAIR
GW_IMPAIR
AINTANG
ASALES
COST_DEBT
CAP_EX
D_ACC
= Domestic Pre-tax Income - Federal Taxable Income (272 - [(63/statutory rate) -
173- 211 - 55])
= change in Postretirement Benefit Asset/(Liability) (330), proxies for effect of
SFAS 106
= hand-collected long-term asset and goodwill impairment data prior to 2000,
Write-down After-tax and Impairments of Goodwill After-tax 2000-2001 (381 +
369), and Write-down After-tax for 2002-2004 (381), proxies for effects of SFAS
121 and SFAS 144
= Impairment of Goodwill After-tax (369) for 2002-2004, 0 otherwise, proxies for
effect of SFAS 142
= Change in non-goodwill intangibles (33 - 204), proxies for effect of SFAS 142
= industry rate of change in Net Sales (12), averaged annually by 3-digit SIC,
times firm-specific lagged Net Sales
= industry-averaged annual interest rate times firm-specific average interest-
bearing debt (9 + 34), where interest rate is Interest Expense (15) divided by
average interest-bearing debt
= industry-averaged capital expenditure rate times firm-specific Gross Property,
Plant, and Equipment (7), where capital expenditure rate is Property, Plant, and
Equipment - Capital Expenditures (30) / Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment
= Actual Accruals - Normal Accruals, where the Normal Accrual-to-Asset rate is
calculated annually using the standard Jones Model at the 3-digit SIC level and
applied to firm-specific Total Assets (6)
BT_GAP
TABLE 14
Effect of Alternative Factors on the Book-Tax Income Gap, separating SFAS 121 and 144
(30,423 firm-year observations, 1993-2004)
BT_GAP =f (AOPEB, IMPAIR121, GW_IMPAIR, AINTANG, IMPAIR144
ASALES, COST_DEBT, CAP_EX, D_ACC, -)
pred Coef. Std. Error P>z
AOPEB + -0.043 0.101 0.67
IMPAIR121 + 1.128 0.029 0.00
GW IMPAIR + 1.265 0.160 0.00
AINTANG + 0.044 0.032 0.17
IMPAIR144 + 0.511 0.539 0.34
Industry General Business Condition Variables
ASALES + 0.000 0.000 0.23
COST_DEBT - 0.003 0.001 0.06
CAP_EX + 0.381 0.068 0.00
Earnings Management Variable
ID_ACC + 0.000 0.000 0I .00
R-squared 60.61%
Statistical significance in OLS regression determined using White standard errors.
Variable Definitions
BT_GAP
AOPEB
IMPAIR121
GW_IMPAIR
AINTANG
IMPAIR144
ASALES
COST_DEBT
CAP_EX
D_ACC
(Compustat data item in parentheses, where applicable):
= Domestic Pre-tax Income - Federal Taxable Income (272
173- 211 - 55])
- [(63/statutory rate) -
= change in Postretirement Benefit Asset/(Liability) (330), proxies for effect of
SFAS 106
= hand-collected long-term asset and goodwill impairment data prior to 2000,
Write-down After-tax and Impairments of Goodwill After-tax 2000-2001 (381 +
369), proxies for effect of SFAS 121
= Impairment of Goodwill After-tax (369) for 2002-2004, 0 otherwise, proxies for
effect of SFAS 142
= Change in non-goodwill intangibles (33 - 204), proxies for effect of SFAS 142
= Write-down After-tax for 2002-2004 (381), proxies for effect of SFAS 144
= industry rate of change in Net Sales (12), averaged annually by 3-digit SIC,
times firm-specific lagged Net Sales
= industry-averaged annual interest rate times firm-specific average interest-
bearing debt (9 + 34), where interest rate is Interest Expense (15) divided by
average interest-bearing debt
= industry-averaged capital expenditure rate times firm-specific Gross Property,
Plant, and Equipment (7), where capital expenditure rate is Property, Plant, and
Equipment - Capital Expenditures (30) / Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment
= Actual Accruals - Normal Accruals, where the Normal Accrual-to-Asset rate is
calculated annually using the standard Jones Model at the 3-digit SIC level and
applied to firm-specific Total Assets (6)
GAAP Change Variables
TABLE 15
Effect of Alternative Factors on the Book-Tax Income Gap
BTGAP =f(AOPEB, IMPAIR, GW_IMPAIR, AINTANG,
ASALES, COST_DEBT, CAP_EX, D_ACC, E)
Panel A: By Industry Adjusted
n R-squared
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 67 53.50%
Mining 949 51.36%
Construction 299 12.62%
Manufacturing 13,562 76.91%
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 2774 62.92%
Wholesale Trade 1128 13.40%
Retail Trade 2154 40.87%
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 2253 18.70%
Services 6746 40.59%
Public Administration and Nonclassifiable Establishments 491 97.55%
Panel B: Weighted
n R-squared
Total Assets (DATA6) 30,423 44.64%
Net Sales (DATA12) 29,195 43.27%
Market Value of Equity (DATA25 * DATA199) 28,698 52.47%
Variable Definitions (Compustat data item in parentheses, where applicable):
BT_GAP = Domestic Pre-tax Income - Federal Taxable Income (272 - [(63/statutory rate) -
173- 211 - 55])
AOPEB = change in Postretirement Benefit Asset/(Liability) (330), proxies for effect of
SFAS 106
IMPAIR = hand-collected long-term asset and goodwill impairment data prior to 2000,
Write-down After-tax and Impairments of Goodwill After-tax 2000-2001 (381 +
369), and Write-down After-tax for 2002-2004 (381), proxies for effects of SFAS
121 and SFAS 144
GW_IMPAIR = Impairment of Goodwill After-tax (369) for 2002-2004, 0 otherwise, proxies for
effect of SFAS 142
AINTANG = Change in non-goodwill intangibles (33 -204), proxies for effect of SFAS 142
ASALES = industry rate of change in Net Sales (12), averaged annually by 3-digit SIC,
times firm-specific lagged Net Sales
COST_DEBT = industry-averaged annual interest rate times firm-specific average interest-
bearing debt (9 + 34), where interest rate is Interest Expense (15) divided by
average interest-bearing debt
CAP_EX = industry-averaged capital expenditure rate times firm-specific Gross Property,
Plant, and Equipment (7), where capital expenditure rate is Property, Plant, and
Equipment - Capital Expenditures (30) / Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment
D_ACC = Actual Accruals - Normal Accruals, where the Normal Accrual-to-Asset rate is
calculated annually using the standard Jones Model at the 3-digit SIC level and
applied to firm-specific Total Assets (6)
Appendix A - FASB Statements, effective 1993-2004,
affecting the calculation of Book Income
Included Statements
SFAS 106, Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other than Pensions
SFAS 121, Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to be
Disposed Of
SFAS 142, Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets
SFAS 144, Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets
Excluded Statements (organized by primary reason for exclusion)
Statement applies primarily to financial services firms
SFAS 114, Accounting by Creditors for Impairment of a Loan
SFAS 125, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of
Liabilities
SFAS 134, Accounting for Mortgage-Backed Securities Retained after the Securitization of
Mortgage Loans Held for Sale by a Mortgage Banking Enterprise
SFAS 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of
Liabilities - a replacement of FASB Statement No. 125
Statement is immaterial for a majority of firms
SFAS 112, Accounting for Postemployment Benefits
SFAS 143, Accounting for Asset Retirement Obligations
SFAS 146, Accounting for Costs Associated with Exit or Disposal Activities
SFAS 150, Accounting for Certain Financial Instruments with Characteristics of both Liabilities
and Equity
Unable to measure effects of Statement
SFAS 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities
SFAS 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities
SFAS 137, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities - Deferral of the
Effective Date of FASB Statement No. 133 - an amendment of FASB Statement No. 133
SFAS 138, Accounting for Certain Derivative Instruments and Certain Hedging Activities - an
Amendment of FASB Statement No. 133
SFAS 141, Business Combinations
SFAS 149, Amendment of statement 133 on Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities
Measurement of Statement Contains other Included Statements
SFAS 109, Accounting for Income Taxes
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1. INTRODUCTION
The substantial gap between aggregate book and tax earnings at various points in the last
decade has attracted the interest of policy-makers and researchers. Desai (2005), Hanlon and
Shevlin (2005), the Joint Committee on Taxation (2006) and Mills and Plesko (2003) among
others have documented the growing aggregate book-tax difference and have sought to identify its
source. Early studies of book tax-differences, such as Cloyd (1995), Cloyd, Pratt and Stock
(1996) and Mills (1998), attributed book-tax differences to tax aggressiveness. More recent work,
such as Hanlon (2005) and Lev and Nissim (2004), has shifted toward analyzing the implications
of book-tax differences for financial reporting quality. Nearly all of this work has relied on a
single, aggregate measure of each firm's book-tax gap for both descriptive purposes and as a basis
for hypothesis testing. This approach neglects the substantial heterogeneity across firms in the
relationship between book and tax income.
We depart from this pattern and examine the detailed components of book-tax differences
for a sample of the fifty largest firms in the U.S. capital market between 1994 and 2004. These
firms account for approximately 38.6 percent of the aggregate market capitalization for the U.S.
corporate sector. Temporary differences, which result in transitory differences between tax
expense for book and tax purposes, generate balance sheet entries that reflect their cumulative
value. A deferred tax asset (DTA) measures taxes that have already been paid, but not accrued for
accounting purposes, while a deferred tax liability (DTL) measures taxes that have been accrued
for book purposes but not yet paid. Previous work has not explored the relative importance of
temporary and permanent differences in contributing to the divergence between book and taxable
income. Our study seeks to fill this gap by collecting data on temporary differences and deferred
tax assets and liabilities.
Although primarily descriptive, our approach permits us to answer several questions that
bear on the design of corporate tax policy and the interpretation of book-tax differences for tax
compliance versus financial reporting quality. First, we document the important role of temporary
differences in contributing to the book-tax gap, thereby shedding light on the extent to which this
gap represents a permanent loss of tax revenue or a re-timing of revenue across tax reporting
periods. Temporary differences are frequently as important, or more important, than permanent
differences in contributing to the difference between book and taxable income. The proportion of
firms with a net deferred tax liability increases during our sample period. When we disaggregate
net deferred tax positions, we find that key contributors to the increase include leases, property,
plant and equipment, and valuation allowances.
Second, our results raise questions about whether the widening book-tax gap was
primarily the result of more aggressive tax sheltering. Our findings suggest that tax sheltering,
which strives to permanently remove tax liability, is not the sole source, or perhaps even the
largest source, of book-tax differences. While the U.S. Treasury (1999) speculated that the
growing book-tax income gap indicated increasing corporate tax shelters, our findings suggest
that at least some of the increase was the result of possibly benign measurement differences such
as depreciation.
Finally, our results bear on the long-standing question of firm heterogeneity with respect
to tax status and preferences for tax reform. Net DTLs, which indicate a positive book-tax income
gap, are both more frequent and are larger on average in our sample than net DTAs, which
indicate a negative book-tax income gap. This suggests that there are more firms that will gain
from the revaluation of deferred tax positions than will lose from such revaluation if Congress
reduced the statutory corporate tax rate. We use our data on deferred tax positions to illustrate
how revaluation of deferred tax positions that resulted from past temporary differences can affect
tax expense. We consider the effect of a change in the statutory corporate tax rate. If Congress
had reduced the statutory federal corporate income tax rate from 35 percent to 30 percent, the
average firm in our sample would have experienced a $343 million increase in reported net
income as a result of revaluation of deferred tax positions. Extrapolating from our sample to the
entire U.S. corporate sector suggests that aggregate net deferred tax positions are on the order of
$400 billion, and that a deferred tax revaluation caused by a five percent statutory rate reduction
would raise aggregate net income in the enactment year by about $60.5 billion. Temporary
differences thus appear significant both as a percentage of the book-tax income gap and in terms
of their potential impact on net income.
Machine-readable data, such as the deferred tax liability balance recorded by Compustat,
does not provide a reasonable proxy for a firm's deferred tax position. This measure captures
only long-term deferred tax liabilities as reported on the balance sheet while omitting deferred tax
positions reported as assets or as short-term liabilities. This variable does not permit researchers
to identify firms with net deferred tax assets or to accurately measure the entire position of those
firms with net liabilities. Our paper provides the first detailed data on the size and components of
deferred tax positions for a significant sample of firms. We hope that researchers and standard-
setters will find this information useful as they strive to understand the incentives induced by
these positions.
We divide our analysis of temporary book-tax differences into six sections. The first
provides a more detailed account of how temporary differences generate deferred tax assets and
liabilities. The next section describes the data set that we have assembled from a sample of SEC
filings and identifies a number of potential limitations with these data. Section three presents
summary statistics on the number of firms in our sample with DTAs and DTLs and on the total
value of these deferred tax positions. It also disaggregates book-tax differences and reports the
components due to investments in property, plant and equipment, retiree health benefits, and other
factors. Section four develops a simple algorithm for extrapolating the findings from our sample
to the aggregate U.S. corporate sector. The fifth section examines how the past accumulation of
temporary differences can affect net income through potential revaluations. There is a brief
conclusion that explores implications for tax policy and suggests future research directions.
2. TEMPORARY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BOOK AND TAX EARNINGS
SFAS 109, Accounting for Income Taxes, which took effect for fiscal years beginning
after December 15, 1991, governs the calculation of tax expense. SFAS 109 uses a balance sheet
approach to the determination of the income tax provision, specifically with regard to deferred tax
expense. Under SFAS 109, deferred tax expense is calculated as the change in the net deferred
tax position. To calculate the ending deferred tax position, temporary differences are cumulated
over time and tax-effected using the current statutory tax rates. Temporary book-tax differences
are the result of disparities in the timing of an income component's inclusion in book and tax
earnings. When tax rates are constant through time, a firm's deferred tax expense equals the
current statutory tax rate times temporary book-tax differences which arise in the current period.
However, the nature of the balance sheet approach outlined in SFAS 109 requires revaluing net
deferred tax positions upon a rate change. The revaluation of the deferred tax asset or liability is
then included in net income through the deferred tax expense.
While the balance sheet approach directed by SFAS 109 appears relatively complicated
with regard to deferred taxes, in most instances the following simplification yields approximately
the same result. Total tax expense, which measures the taxes that will be due at some point in
time on current period income, equals the product of the statutory corporate tax rate and taxable
book income. Taxable book income equals pre-tax book income less permanent differences
between book and tax income. Permanent differences arise when a component of income enters
one earnings measure but not the other. The exclusion of tax-exempt interest from taxable but not
book income is an example. The effect of permanent differences on the firm's accounting
earnings and cash flow is fully reflected in the year when these differences accrue.
While only permanent differences affect total tax expense, both permanent and temporary
differences affect taxable income reported to the IRS. Temporary book-tax differences arise when
book and tax rules differ not on the treatment of an income component but on the timing of its
inclusion in book and tax earnings. The difference between book and tax depreciation is an
example. In the absence of revaluation, temporary differences do not affect net income. Rather,
temporary differences affect the partition of total tax expense between current and deferred tax
expense.
Deferred Tax Expense = Total Tax Expense - Current Tax Expense. (1)
Temporary differences generate future, opposite-signed effects on taxable income, while
permanent differences do not. Because temporary differences affect earnings twice, first by
creating a deferred tax position and then by eliminating it, they lead to more complex earnings
dynamics than permanent differences.
Deferred tax positions equal the current statutory corporate tax rate times the sum of
temporary differences that will reverse in the future, which is the same as the historical sum of the
firm's temporary differences:
Deferred Tax Liabilityt = Tt*(EiTemporary Differencest.i) (2)
Firms with a positive sum of temporary differences have a net deferred tax liability (DTL). Such
firms have not yet paid taxes on income that has been recorded for accounting purposes. Firms
for which taxable income has exceeded book income, in contrast, have a deferred tax asset
(DTA); they are entitled to future tax relief since they have already paid taxes on income that has
not yet been reported for accounting purposes.
If a firm is in a steady state, with stable investment in every year and corresponding
stability in other flow and balance sheet items, temporary differences should not have any net
effect on book income relative to taxable income. The reductions in taxable income relative to
book income generated by recently-acquired assets subject to accelerated depreciation, for
example, should offset the increases in taxable income relative to book income on older assets that
have already been completely depreciated for tax purposes. When the economy is growing,
however, or the firm experiences swings in investment from year to year, temporary differences
from alternative vintages of investment will not be of equal magnitude so they may affect book
relative to taxable income. When recent investments are larger than investments in earlier years,
temporary differences could reduce taxable income relative to book income. Similar patterns
could emerge as a result of other temporary components.
Our paper studies temporary differences by analyzing deferred tax positions reported
under SFAS 109. Three features of SFAS 109 are particularly significant for our study. First,
firms must report both DTAs and DTLs, not just a net deferred tax position. Deferred tax
positions are presented on the balance sheet based on current/non-current classification, as
determined by the current/non-current status of the underlying asset or liability that gave rise to
the deferred tax position. Second, firms must adjust their reported DTAs and DTLs when laws
change. Changes in statutory corporate tax rates, in particular, must be reflected in a firm's DTAs
or DTLs. For many firms, and for many but not all components of deferred taxes, a reduction in
the statutory corporate tax rate would reduce DTAs and thereby have a negative effect on reported
earnings. Third, SFAS 109 requires firms to report a valuation allowance that reflects the
probability of realizing deferred tax assets. This permits investors to more accurately value the
tax benefit associated with a deferred tax asset.41
41 A prior regulation, SFAS 96, required firms to report the asset and liability detail of their net deferred tax
position and to revalue their deferred tax position for changes in enacted rates or laws. The probability of
realizing an asset was incorporated into the value of the asset, rather than separately stated as a valuation
allowance. Few firms complied with SFAS 96 because it was replaced by SFAS 109 before the implementation
period ended.
Studying deferred tax positions requires labor-intensive data collection because machine-
readable data only report long-term deferred tax liabilities (Compustat DATA74). Chen and
Schoderbek (2000) find that analysts' reactions to changes in deferred tax positions that were
triggered by the 1993 corporate tax rate increase were of similar magnitude to their reactions to
other components of earnings. This is surprising, since the persistence and predictive power of
this component of earnings is likely to be different from that of other earnings components.
Givoly and Hayn (1992) study how share prices of firms with deferred tax liabilities reacted to the
passage of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which reduced corporate tax rates. They find that the
decline in corporate rates had a favorable effect on firms with deferred tax liabilities. Amir,
Kirschenheiter and Willard (AKW) (1997) disaggregate deferred taxes and study how the market
values various components. They find some evidence that market participants examine deferred
tax positions at a disaggregate level. Our paper follows AKW (1997) in disaggregating deferred
tax balances, but while they explore the market valuation of these disaggregated balances, we
study the potential impact of these balances on the income statement.
To systematically advance our understanding of the effects of deferred tax positions on
market and policy decisions, researchers need data on components of these deferred tax positions.
Our study provides this information for a substantial sample of large corporations. Component-
level data allows us to more accurately estimate the effects of various policy changes, such as the
tax rate decrease considered in Section 6.1. It may also allow researchers to observe time-trend
patterns in specific components which provide evidence on the effect of policy changes or which
support particular theories of the behavioral explanation of the evolving book-tax gap. Examples
include the increase in deferred tax assets related to carryforwards following the Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997 and the decrease in revenue-related liabilities following SEC Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 101.
3. DATA COLLECTION AND LIMITATIONS
Publicly-available data sources such as Compustat do not contain sufficient detail on
deferred tax positions to permit analysis of temporary book-tax differences. We therefore collect
data from the tax footnote in 10-K filings for FORTUNE 50 firms for fiscal years between 1993
and 2004. Our sample begins in FY 1993 because 1993 is the first year when all firms' financial
statements were prepared in accordance with SFAS 109. FORTUNE ranks firms by gross
revenue.42 Our sample includes both financial and non-financial firms. Since we are interested in
tracking deferred tax positions over time, we use the annual FORTUNE 50 lists to construct a
panel data set. For any firm in the FORTUNE 50 in any year of our sample, we collect data for
the entire sample period. There is moderate turnover in the FORTUNE 50. Only 25 of the firms
in the 1995 FORTUNE 50 were in the 2004 FORTUNE 50. Nine of the 50 firms on the 1995 list
had been acquired by 2004. In a typical year, five firms leave the FORTUNE 50 for various
reasons. One hundred firms appear in the FORTUNE 50 at least once between 1995 and 2004.
We drop four firms from this group: State Farm Insurance and TIAA-CREF, which are private
companies that do not need to file 10-Ks, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are
government-sponsored enterprises. Our sample includes the remaining ninety-six firms.
Corporate control transactions complicate the problem of tracking FORTUNE 50 firms
through time. Sample firms acquire other firms, or in some cases are themselves acquired. When
this occurs we include the acquired or acquiring firm in earlier years. To preserve data
comparability over time, we create what we label as "super-firms" by combining the distinct
accounts of the two firms that subsequently consolidated. This effort provides an unanticipated
opportunity to learn about deferred taxes. As noted above, deferred tax balances normally
represent the beginning balance plus or minus that year's deferred tax expense (benefit).
42 Prior to 1995, Fortune rankings included only manufacturing firms. To avoid including firms that are only
included in the Fortune 50 due to the exclusion of non-manufacturing firms, we formed our sample using the
Fortune rankings from 1995-2004.
However, merger and acquisition activity can generate large changes in deferred tax balances
simply by changing the firm-large changes that do not arise from temporary differences
generated in the current period. The super-firm methodology aims to eliminate these changes by
including the deferred tax positions of acquired firms with their eventual parent even before the
transaction occurs.
Because most of the companies acquired by FORTUNE 50 firms are companies that are
not part of the FORTUNE 50, constructing super-firms involves data collection on many small
firms. This increases the number of firms in our sample for at least one year to 406; these firms
combine to create 82 super-firms. Due both to limited availability of electronic filings in the early
years of our sample and to the non-traded nature of some firms, the number of super-firms in our
sample rises from 72 in the first year (1993) to 79 in the final year (2004). Appendix A lists our
sample firms. In our analysis of deferred tax positions, we use super-firms rather than individual
companies as our units of observation to preserve comparability across years.
SFAS 109 mandates the following disclosures: (i) an income.tax summary, which details
the significant components of income tax expense; (ii) a rate reconciliation, which reconciles
reported income tax expense with the amount that would result from applying the domestic
federal statutory rate to pretax income; and (iii) a schedule of deferred tax positions, which
provides information about DTAs and DTLs. Firms also are expected to disclose information
regarding the amounts and expiration dates of loss and credit carry-forwards, the division of tax
expense between continuing operations and all other items, the composition between domestic
and foreign earnings before income taxes, and temporary differences for which the firm has not
recorded a deferred tax liability, including permanently reinvested foreign earnings.
We collect the tax summary, rate reconciliation and schedule of deferred tax positions
from tax footnotes, and we rely primarily on the last of these. There is substantial variation across
firms in the level of detail presented in the tax footnote, although most firms follow a fairly stable
reporting policy from year to year. Appendix B describes our procedure for disaggregating DTAs
and DTLs into their component parts. We match each firm-year observation with Compustat
using both firm name and year, and validate the match using total assets and net income.43
4. SUMMARY FINDINGS
Table 1 presents summary information on the sample of firms we analyze. It reports the
number of firms we study in each year, their total market value and the aggregate gap between
their book and tax income. Similar to the world-wide tax-to-book ratio developed in Lev and
Nissim (2004), we define the book-tax income gap on a world-wide basis as Pre-Tax Income less
estimated Taxable Income, where Taxable Income is defined as Current Tax Expense divided by
the maximum corporate statutory tax rate.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
The trend in the aggregate book-tax income gap in the early part of our sample resembles
that reported in Desai (2003). The last four columns show the number of firms in each sample-
year that report deferred tax assets, the number that report deferred tax liabilities and the total
value of these deferred tax positions. The data demonstrate the heterogeneity in firm tax
positions, as well as the evolution of these positions through time. In 1993, 31 super-firms report
net deferred tax assets which total $52.2 billion, while 41 report net deferred tax liabilities totaling
$75.6 billion. The proportion of net DTL firms increases through our sample period, and in 2004,
28 of the 79 sample super-firms report net DTAs, while 51 report net DTLs.
43 We collected tax information from the first 10-K or annual report filing for each fiscal year. Restatements
may cause differences between the total assets and net income entries in the 10-K and those reported in
Compustat. We hand-checked the 47 firm-years where neither DATA6 nor DATA172 corresponded to ourhand-collected total assets and net income numbers. The majority of differences were due to restatements. Wedropped 39 firm-years for which Compustat did not have data or where a stub year caused a mismatch.
Table I shows that the proportion of firms with a net DTL has grown over the period. In
addition firms with a net DTL have larger deferred tax positions than firms with a DTA. The
average net DTL is $1.8 billion in 1993 while the average net DTA is $1.7 billion; the average net
DTL is $4.4 billion in 2004 while the average net DTA is $2.5 billion. The average net DTL
increases 140 percent during our sample, while the average net DTA increases only 46 percent.
Table 2 reports further details regarding our sample. We report the median, mean and
aggregate book-tax income gap for our super-firm sample as well as the median, mean and
aggregate share of the estimated book-tax income gap attributable to temporary differences.44 We
calculate temporary differences as deferred tax expense divided by the maximum corporate
statutory tax rate. Although for the share of the imputed book-tax difference attributable to
temporary differences for the median firm varies somewhat from year to year, in every year
temporary differences comprise the majority of this difference. The mean share attributable to
temporary differences is less well-behaved - it often falls above 100% or below zero. This
indicates that temporary and permanent differences are sometimes of opposite sign. Additionally,
the mean share is much less stable than the median share.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
The increased variance observed in the mean share attributable to temporary differences
versus the median share is in part driven by the increased variance in the mean versus median
book-tax income gap. This is often a denominator effect in periods when the book-tax gap is
relatively small and the temporary and permanent differences are of different signs. For example,
the relatively high mean share in 1995 is driven by the super-firms AMR Corp and Amoco, which
have temporary shares of 7859% and 12702%, respectively. AMR Corp reports very small
44 The sum of temporary and permanent differences equals the booktax income gap. While we only report the
share attributable to temporary differences, the share attributable to permanent differences is straightforward to
calculate.
federal tax expense in 1995 ($50 Million) compared with every other year in our sample ($292
Million on average). However, the book-tax income gap for AMR Corp in 1995 is less than $2
Million, relative to an approximate average gap of $830 Million for all other years in the sample.
Therefore, the very large share attributable to temporary difference in 1995 is not driven by large
permanent or temporary differences in 1995 but rather by the fact that these temporary and
permanent differences nearly offset, resulting in a very small book-tax income gap for 1995.
Amoco's large temporary share in 1995, and in fact the unusual mean shares attributable to
temporary differences observed in many years, are driven by very similar situations.
Another way to look at the temporary share of the book-tax gap is at the aggregate level.
This method resolves some of the small denominator issues discussed above, but introduces other
difficulties. To calculate the aggregate ratio we sum the numerator and denominator separately,
then take the ratio. Firms with large book-tax gaps or large temporary differences are more
influential in this measure. Columns 6 and 7 of Table 2 present aggregate figures. From year to
year the aggregate ratio is more stable than the mean ratio but less stable than the median ratio.
Again, this is due to the weighting of firms with large differences. Tables 3 and 4 explore the
increases in temporary differences which have contributed to the rise in the book-tax income gap
and present detailed information on the composition of deferred tax positions. Table 3
disaggregates deferred tax positions into their constituent components, and indicates the sources
of the most important temporary book-tax differences. Table 4 separates DTA positions from
DTL positions for components which do not consist almost exclusively of either assets or
liabilities. Average firm amounts facilitate comparison across years with different sample sizes,
although they are sensitive to the set of firms in the sample.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
The results in Table 3 demonstrate that the key sources of deferred tax positions within
our twelve year sample vary, but not sharply. Early in the sample, the most important source of
deferred tax assets, other than unclassifiable deferred tax positions, was "benefits," which
includes benefits related to current employees as well as retiree health benefits and pensions. The
most important source of deferred tax liabilities was "property." In 2004, it was still the most
significant deferred tax liability category. "Credits and carryforwards" replace "benefits" as the
most significant deferred tax asset, while "benefits" remains a major contributor.
While the overall ranking of various categories does not change dramatically during the
twelve years of our sample, the magnitude of certain categories does. For example, deferred tax
positions related to mark-to-market adjustments rise and fall with the general equity market. Tax
Credits and Other Carryforwards increase 245 percent while NOL Carryforwards increase 175
percent, consistent with the extension of the carryforward period under the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997. Deferred tax liabilities related to property increase 60% during our sample. Possible
explanations for the rise in Property, Plant & Equipment are special tax depreciation rules
implemented in the second half of our sample as well as the implementation of SFAS 142, which
removed book amortization of intangible assets. Table 3 demonstrates that the increase in
temporary differences contributing to the rise in the book-tax income gap was not driven by a
particular category. Rather, many deferred tax liabilities, including Property, Subsidiary-Related
Items and Valuation Allowance, increase.45
Table 4 separates DTAs from DTLs for the deferred tax components that include
substantial assets as well as liabilities. Some categories, such as "revenue related," appear
relatively small when the net deferred tax positions are presented in Table 3, but represent a
45 Corporate control activity may confound the interpretation of changes in deferred tax positions. Mergers and
acquisitions change a firm's size as well as the significance and composition of its deferred tax positions. While
we try to address this concern by analyzing deferred tax positions at the super-firm level, we cannot eliminate it,
especially since merger and acquisition activity can itself affect deferred tax positions.
significant deferred tax asset for some firms and a significant liability for others. For example, a
firm with a deferred revenue liability that received cash and paid income tax on that cash, but did
not record the cash as revenue until the associated goods or services were delivered, would have a
deferred tax asset. A firm with installment sales, which recognizes a gain for book purposes
when the sale closed but recognizes the gain for tax purposes as the payments are made, would
have a deferred tax liability. Table 4 presents additional information that may be helpful in
understanding the contribution of temporary differences to the rise in the book-tax income gap.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
Table 5 reports the distribution of net deferred tax assets or liabilities as a share of firm
assets for each super-firm and for each individual firm. The net deferred tax balance is substantial
for many firms. In 2002, for example, 35 percent of both the super-firms and the individual firms
in our sample reported a net deferred tax position in excess of five percent of assets.
Approximately ten percent of both individual firms and super-firms had a net deferred tax position
exceeding ten percent of assets (untabulated). For super-firms, the maximum (minimum) net
deferred tax asset as a function of assets occurred in 2004 (1995) and was 14.5% (-31.9%).
Overall, Table 5 suggests that while the majority of firms have a small deferred tax position
relative to total assets, a nontrivial number have a much more significant position.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
Table 6 presents information similar to that in Table 5, but it distinguishes financial and
non-financial firms. Financial firms have smaller deferred tax positions, on average, than non-
financial firms. In every sample year, at least 80 percent of the financial firms have a net deferred
tax position, either positive or negative, that represents less than three percent of total assets. For
non-financial firms, in contrast, about half of the firms have deferred tax assets in this range. The
extreme values of the ratio of deferred tax assets to firm assets are also smaller for financial than
for non-financial firms. The maximum (minimum) Net DTA/Assets for individual financial firms
occurred in 1994 (2000) and was 16.2% (-7.9%) while the maximum (minimum) Net DTA/Assets
for individual non-financial firms occurred in 2001 (1995) and was 48.0% (-46.3%). Though
there is not a significant difference in the percentage of financial and non-financial firms that have
a net DTA or a net DTL position, the distribution of net deferred tax assets for financial firms is
more closely centered around zero than the distribution for non-financial firms.
[Insert Table 6 around here]
5. EXTRAPOLATING SAMPLE VALUES TO ECONOMY-WIDE AGGREGATES
Although our sample includes a very small fraction of the firms in the United States, our
sample firms account for over forty percent of the assets of firms in the Compustat universe in
2004. To more formally link our estimates to aggregate measures for the U.S. economy, we
extrapolate our summary statistics to the aggregate U.S. corporate sector. We do this in two ways.
First, we simply gross up our sample's DTA and DTL aggregates by the ratio of an economy-
wide aggregate, such as assets, to our sample aggregate. Second, we use industry-level
multipliers based on the ratio of Compustat total assets to sample total assets in each two-digit
SIC industry to perform the extrapolation.
We illustrate our first procedure, and then present results from both. If the deferred tax
position of firm i in year t is Dit, and the firm's net assets are Ait, the total deferred tax assets of
our sample firms equals D*t = 1i Dit. Similarly, the total assets of sample firms equal A*t = 1i Ait.
Assuming deferred tax assets as a share of corporate net assets are similar for firms throughout the
size distribution, then we can estimate the total stock of deferred tax assets (D*tot.t) as
D*tot.t = (Atot.t/A*t)*D*t (3a)
In this expression Ato,t denotes the total assets of U.S. firms, which we estimate from Compustat.
When we extrapolate using industry-level information, we replace (3a) with
D*tot,t = Yj=I,N (Atotj,t/A*j.t)*D*j,t (3b)
where subscript j varies over industries, and Djt = i~iJ Dit denotes the sum of deferred tax
positions for firms within an industry.
One potential difficulty with the disaggregate extrapolation approach is that the industry-
specific multipliers, (Att,j,t/A*j,t), may be very large for some industries in which our sample
includes very few firms. This concern is partially mitigated by the fact that approximately ninety
percent of the gross deferred tax assets and liabilities in our sample are in industries with
multipliers below five. In most sample years, roughly one quarter of the 2-digit SIC code
industries are represented by only a single firm. In 2004 the total assets of the firms in our sample
represented 42.6 percent of the total assets of firms in the Compustat universe. In five 2-digit SIC
industries, oil and gas extraction (29.1 for assets, 19.9 for sales), rubber and miscellaneous
plastics products (17.6, 21.8), primary metal industries (10.3, 8.7), wholesale trade - durable
goods (13.4, 8.0) and educational services (17.9, 15.2), the multiplier used exceeds 10 in 2004.
These industries comprise $47.3 billion of extrapolated economy-wide gross DTA and $68.4
billion of extrapolated economy-wide gross DTL. These high-multiplier industries account for
1.8% of total assets in the 2004 Compustat universe.
A second potential problem is that the large firms in our sample may not be representative
of smaller firms. This could occur if the large firms in most industries are more diversified, and
less likely to experience tax losses, than smaller ones. It is also possible that large firms engage in
more corporate control transactions than smaller firms, thereby inducing different levels of
deferred tax assets than one finds at smaller firms. We do not observe large differences in net or
gross deferred tax positions relative to firm assets for firms in our sample of different size.
Table 7 shows the results of our asset-based extrapolation procedure for gross and net
deferred tax positions. Our estimates suggest that deferred tax positions in the U.S. corporate
sector are substantial. The results from both of our extrapolation procedures indicate that for the
U.S. corporate sector as a whole, net deferred tax liability positions could total more than $350
billion in 2004. For each sample year, our estimate of the aggregate value of gross deferred tax
liabilities exceeds our estimate of the value of gross deferred tax assets. The disparity between
gross DTAs and gross DTLs rises during our sample, and by 2004, we estimate gross deferred tax
liabilities that are roughly forty percent larger than gross deferred tax assets. The rise in deferred
tax liabilities is in part due to the growth of accelerated tax depreciation. Recall that Table 3
showed a rising DTL component from property, plant and equipment between 2000 and 2004,
likely due in part to "bonus depreciation" effective beginning in 2001.
[Insert Table 7 around here]
When interpreting estimates of aggregate deferred tax assets or liabilities, it is important
to recognize that gross DTA and DTL positions offset each other when we are reporting
information for the corporate sector as a whole. For individual firms with either a net DTA or a
net DTL, however, these positions loom much larger. The extrapolation estimate of gross
deferred tax assets for 2004, reported in Table 7, is more than $850 billion, while gross deferred
tax liabilities are more than $1200 billion. Our estimate of the aggregate net DTL in 2004, the
sum of these two gross figures, is roughly $350 billion.
6. THE NET INCOME IMPACT OF DEFERRED TAX POSITIONS
Deferred tax positions affect cash flow in the period in which they are recorded, but they
also affect cash flow, and potentially net income, in future periods. These future-period effects
occur in two ways. First, and most straightforward, upon their reversal, temporary differences
will affect deferred tax expense and therefore affect cash flow by changing the allocation between
current and deferred tax expense. Second, in the event of a revaluation, deferred taxes will affect
net income. We illustrate this with an example that hypothesizes a reduction of five percentage
points in the federal corporate income tax rate. Many other changes in the business environment,
such as changes in corporate law or in GAAP, could also affect deferred tax positions.
6.1. A Corporate Tax Rate Reduction
Using the data in Tables 1 and 2, we can estimate the net income impact of a five
percentage point reduction in the corporate tax rate, including the revaluation of beginning-of-
year deferred tax positions a statutory rate change would trigger. Table 8 presents our estimate.
A lower tax rate directly reduces federal tax expense on current period income and increases the
period's Net Income; we refer to this as its "direct effect". If the 2004 corporate tax rate had been
reduced to 30 percent, the direct effect for the average super-firm would have been a federal tax
expense decrease of $145 million. 46 The average super-firm net income in 2004 was $3,866
million, so this tax expense decrease represents an increase in net income of 3.8%. In the year of
the rate change both a direct effect and a revaluation effect will occur; only the direct effect
persists in subsequent years.
[Insert Table 8 around here]
While we might expect the deferred tax revaluation to be second-order, it is considerably
larger than the direct effect of the statutory rate change. Our estimates suggest that for the
46 Since we are examining a federal tax rate change, we limit the sample to just those firms that report federal
income tax expense separately. This limited sample includes 80.9 percent of all individual firm-year
observations, representing 88.8 percent of sample adjusted net deferred tax positions. The revaluation
calculations excludes deferred tax positions related to tax credits, including foreign tax credits, as well as
available-for-sale (AFS). securities. Because credits directly offset dollars of tax liability , rather than dollars of
taxable income, a rate change will not affect their valuation. The effect of a rate change on AFS securities will
flow through Other Comprehensive Income rather than Net Income.
average super-firm, the revaluation of 2003 deferred tax positions would have increased Net
Income by $343 million, or 8.9%. In total our average super-firm would experience a 12.6%
increase in Net Income-two-thirds of which is attributable to the revaluation effect.
While a reduction in the tax rate would have increased the average super-firm's Net
Income, the effect is not uniform across firms. For Net DTA firms the write-down of Net DTA
decreases Net Income, offsetting the positive Net Income effect of the reduction in the current
period's tax expense. Net DTL firms, on the other hand, reduce the value of a balance sheet
liability; revaluing deferred tax positions increases their Net Income. Net DTA super-firms in our
sample would on average experience a $295 million decrease in net DTA and Net Income; the
lower tax rate would have decreased their current tax expense and increased their Net Income by
$103 million. On net, these firms would report a $192 million earnings decrease due to the rate
change, a 9.4% decrease to their average net income of $3,211 million. Firms in our sample with
a net DTL would experience, on average, a $682 million dollar decrease in their net DTL and a
matching Net Income increase. They would report $167 less in taxes on income generated in the
current period. DTL firms average $4,225 million of net income in 2004. For net DTL firms the
revaluation effect exacerbates the direct tax expense effect. Net Income rises, on average, by 20%
for our sample firms with a net DTL.
Our extrapolations offer some insight on the potential impact of a change in statutory
corporate tax rates on deferred tax positions and the resulting effect through this channel on the
aggregate earnings of U.S. corporations. We will focus on our most conservative extrapolation,
the by-industry asset multiplier, which yields an economy-wide estimate of corporate net deferred
tax liabilities of $302 billion in 2003 (Table 7, column 15). 47 In this case a five percentage point
drop in that rate from 35 to 30 percent would reduce the aggregate net deferred tax positions by
47 Extrapolation on the limited sample of adjusted net deferred tax positions as discussed in footnote 7 yields an
estimate of aggregate corporate net DTL of $423 billion rather than $302 billion.
$60 billion, which in turn would increase reported earnings in the year of the tax rate reduction.
To put this figure in perspective, net income for all domestic, non-subsidiary firms in Compustat
was $818 billion in 2004. This suggests that a five percentage point drop in the rate in 2004
would have increased net income by more than seven percent. Using the same extrapolation
procedure, we project aggregate federal tax expense for 2004 of $195 billion.48 Had this expense
been calculated using a statutory rate of 30 instead of 35 percent, it would have been $167 billion,
a decline of $28 billion or 3.4% of corporate net income. This calculation suggests that at least in
the year of a corporate income tax rate change, the revaluations of deferred tax [psotopms can
have an effect on reported after-tax earnings that is of the same order of magnitude as the effect of
the rate reduction on tax expense generated during the current period.
These averages again mask differing effects for net DTA and net DTL firms. Economy-
wide, net DTA firms would experience a $6 billion increase in Net Income due to the decline in
taxes on current period income; revaluation of their deferred tax assets would cause a $19 billion
simultaneous decrease in their aggregate Net Income. Net DTL firms would enjoy a $79 billion
increase in Net Income due to DTL revaluation as well as a $21 billion decrease in current period
taxes. A five percentage point corporate tax rate reduction would decrease net DTA firm earnings
by $13 billion and increase net DTL firm earnings by $100 billion.
6.2. Deferred Taxes and Corporate Incentives to Lobby for Tax Policy Changes
The foregoing statistics make clear that firms with DTAs are distinct from those with
DTLs. This is important for understanding the incentives that deferred tax positions can induce,
particularly with respect to lobbying or other political activities in support of particular tax
positions. Neubig (2006) argues that firms are very sensitive to the impact of tax reform on their
reported earnings, including effects through the revaluation of DTAs and DTLs. Our findings
48 Extrapolations using sales multipliers suggest an aggregate federal tax expense of $188 billion.
suggest that these effects can be substantial for some firms and that there is substantial
heterogeneity across firms in their exposure to this effect of statutory rate changes. Firms with net
deferred tax assets may lobby against rate cuts while firms with net deferred tax liabilities may
lobby against rate increases. The political history of tax policy changes is replete with examples of
corporate groups with closely-aligned incentives affecting policy design. Corporate pressure from
firms with accumulated net operating losses was one factor in Congress' decision, as part of the
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, to replace the extraterritorial income (ETI) export incentive
with a "qualified production activities income" deduction rather than a reduction in corporate tax
rates. For firms with substantial deferred tax assets attributable to NOLs, a rate cut would have
generated substantial tax expense.
The Ohio legislature recently demonstrated their sensitivity to the Net Income impact of
deferred tax positions on Ohio firms. The legislature, in enacting a corporate tax reform, designed
transition rules to address the concerns of firms that would lose deferred tax assets when the
corporate income tax was replaced by a gross receipts tax. The reform provided three measures of
transition relief to affected firms. First, firms operating in Ohio under the income tax regime were
encouraged to schedule the reversal of their temporary differences during the phase-out of the
corporate income tax. To the extent that any temporary items would not reverse by the end of the
phase-out, an adjustment for the estimated deferred tax position at the end of the transition period
was recognized in income in the period in which the phase-out began. Second, certain deferred
tax assets, primarily research and development tax credits, were retained as credits under the new
activity tax regime. These credits are not recorded as assets on the financial books of the firm,
however, because SFAS 109 applies only to taxes on income. Finally, Ohio provided for a
transitional tax credit aimed at those firms with large NOL carryforwards, who would lose the
ability to use these assets under the new tax regime. These policies together provide transition
relief to firms that were 'owed' tax relief in the future under the income tax regime and that lost
this prospective tax relief as a result of the tax reform.
6.3. Limitations
Our revaluation estimates should be viewed with caution, because data limitations make it
difficult to determine exactly which DTAs and DTLs relate to U.S. federal temporary differences.
Several specific cautions bear emphasis. First, SFAS 109 is a world-wide consolidated firm
disclosure. Most firms are taxed in multiple jurisdictions, but they do not disaggregate income tax
disclosures by jurisdiction. Most firms consolidate foreign and domestic tax accounts, as well as
state, local and federal tax accounts within the United States. This makes it difficult to determine
how changes in U.S. federal statutory tax rates alone would impact the reported DTAs and DTLs.
Rather than attempt to disaggregate these different jurisdictions using an arbitrary method, we
assume that all DTAs and DTLs relate to federal temporary differences.
Second, not all DTAs and DTLs are affected by statutory rate changes. Tax credit carry-
forwards, for example, are not affected by rate changes because they are credits not deductions.
We address this concern by separating credits from other carry-forwards where possible. We
make the conservative assumption that any disclosure which includes credits, such as "Net
Operating Loss and Credit Carry-forwards or Tax Carry-forwards," is comprised entirely of
credits. In 2003, credit carry-forwards including foreign tax credit carry-forwards average $551
million per sample firm, or almost 60 percent of the total carry-forward category. When we
estimate the revaluation effect of a tax rate change, credits are removed from the base deferred tax
positions which would be revalued.
Third, we assume that changes in DTAs and DTLs will affect net income. There are at
least two instances where this will not be the case. Mark-to-market adjustments for available-for-
sale (AFS) securities will affect Other Comprehensive Income rather than Net Income. Changes
to purchased DTAs and DTLs will affect Goodwill rather than Net Income. This assumption will
not affect our estimates of the change in the DTA or DTL but will cause us to overestimate the
effect of such a change on Net Income. While we do not often have information about purchased
DTAs and DTLs, firms do sometimes disclose deferred tax positions related to AFS securities
separately. Where possible, we separate AFS securities from other items marked-to-market.
Disclosed AFS securities are a very small proportion of total mark-to-market deferred tax
positions. Net deferred tax positions related to AFS securities average $6 million per firm in
2003; net deferred tax positions related to total mark-to-market securities average -$298 million.
When we estimate the revaluation effect of a tax rate change, AFS securities are removed from
the base deferred tax positions which would be revalued.
Finally, firms may make different auxiliary assumptions in computing and presenting the
value of DTAs and DTLs. These differences may lead a statutory tax change to have different
impacts on different firms. We do not have any information regarding the detailed calculations
underlying the tax footnotes, so we are unable to address such potential heterogeneity.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper explores the role of temporary differences in contributing to the disparity
between book and tax earnings for large U.S. corporations. We find that temporary differences
comprise a substantial fraction of the book-tax gap and in some periods represent more than half
of the aggregate. Temporary differences not only contribute to the book-tax difference in the
period they are recorded; they also result in an equal-signed but opposite contribution to the book-
tax disparity in some future year. Temporary differences which increase the book-tax income gap
are larger than those which decrease it. More than half of the firms in our sample have a net
deferred tax liability, which reflects the accumulation of past excesses of book income over
taxable income. Additionally, the average net deferred tax liability position is greater than the
average net deferred tax asset position.
The growth in net deferred tax positions during our sample is consistent with the
increasing reliance on fair value GAAP accounting. Proponents of fair value accounting believe
that a focus on relevance, including market prices for assets and liabilities, will increase the
information content of accounting reports. The tax code has not followed GAAP in moving
toward fair value accounting, remaining instead with a cash-basis, transaction-driven framework.
In some cases, this difference has generated sharp increases in book-tax differences. For example,
deferred tax liabilities based on SFAS 115, which allows marking-to-market for securities when
firms have particular intentions for those securities, nearly tripled between 1993 and 2004. SFAS
123R, which requires expensing of stock options when they are granted using estimates of their
value generated by financial models, seems likely to result in a sharp increase in deferred tax
positions. Temporary book-tax differences are likely to become increasingly important in the
future as the growing reliance on fair value accounting raises deferred tax assets and liabilities.
While the average firm in our sample records a fairly small net deferred tax liability, firms
exhibit substantial heterogeneity in their deferred tax positions. In 2004, more than forty percent
of the firms in our sample report a net deferred tax position valued at more than five percent of
corporate assets. Financial firms exhibit less heterogeneity than non-financial service firms with
only ten percent of the financial firms in our sample reporting a net deferred tax position more
than five percent of assets. This heterogeneity shows that deferred tax positions are considerable
for a large sub-set of firms. It also suggests that firms may have significantly different incentives
regarding tax and financial reforms depending on whether they have a large net deferred tax asset
position, a large net deferred tax liability position or a small net deferred tax position.
To demonstrate the potential importance of revaluations in deferred tax assets, we
estimate the net income effects of a five percentage point reduction in the corporate tax rate in
2004. We find that the average firm in our sample would experience a $343 million, or 8.9%,
increase to net income. When we separate firms based on their net positions, we find that the
average revaluation effect for a firm with a net deferred tax asset position is a $295 million (9.2%)
decrease to net income while the average revaluation effect for a firm with a net deferred tax
liability position is a $682 million (16.1%) increase. This simple exercise demonstrates the
dramatically different incentives deferred tax positions can induce.
Our results suggest a number of possibilities for future research. Our descriptive findings
raise the important question of how firms respond to the incentives created by deferred tax assets
and liabilities. The detailed information on tax accounts that we have collected may also provide
a starting point for other studies on the interplay between financial accounting for taxes and
various aspects of corporate behavior. Mattozzi (2005) and Knight (2007) study patterns of
corporate campaign contributions in the 2000 United States presidential election and discover that
firms whose stock prices rise with a candidate's probability of victory are more likely to
contribute to that candidate. One could use information on tax burdens associated with various
tax policy changes to study lobbying efforts or campaign giving to explore related issues in the tax
area. Information on the components of deferred tax assets and liabilities, for example, offers
valuable insights into diverse issues including the importance of investments in assets that qualify
for more favorable tax depreciation than book depreciation and the significance of accruals for
post-employment benefits. We hope to explore some of these issues in future work.
While our results offer important insights on the relative importance of temporary and
permanent differences and on the significance of DTAs and DTLs for U.S. corporations, they are
necessarily limited by our modest sample. Because the tax footnote information is not publicly
available in electronic form, the possibility of a database that includes detailed information for all
publicly traded firms seems remote. Nevertheless, we hope to ultimately expand our sample and
to be able to develop better estimates of aggregate deferred tax assets and liabilities.
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics by Year
Aggregate Book- Cross-sectional Super-Firms with Net DTA Super-Firms with Net DTL
Number of Tax Income Gap StandardYear Capitalization of Aggregate Number AggregateSuper-Firms of Super-Firms Deviation of Net Number e Number ggregateSuper-Firms ($B) Value ($B) Value ($B)
1993 72 1,760 -8.15 3.45 31 52.2 41 -75.6
1994 77 1,831 35.83 3.16 36 53.0 41 -76.4
1995 77 2,525 32.15 3.11 32 41.7 45 -81.8
1996 79 3,237 37.90 3.32 31 43.9 48 -95.4
1997 79 4,364 27.96 3.74 30 46.9 49 -107.6
1998 78 5,765 20.26 3.98 35 58.0 43 -107.4
1999 78 6,650 69.10 5.33 33 52.0 45 -145.9
2000 78 6,346 57.80 6.18 30 58.3 48 -165.7
2001 79 5,936 -33.88 6.51 33 69.1 46 -182.5
2002 79 4,543 -2.75 7.26 33 94.1 46 -186.0
2003 79 5,466 137.31 7.47 30 69.7 49 -228.6
2004 79 5,800 84.46 6.94 28 69.1 51 -225.1
Sample includes firms ranked in the Fortune 50 from 1995-2004. To standardize firms across time, firms engaged in merger, acquisition, or divestiture activity
with the Fortune 50 ranked firm are included with the Fortune 50 ranked firm to create a "super-firm." Market capitalization is calculated from Compustat as
Common Shares Outstanding (DATA25) multiplied by fiscal year-end price (DATA199). The Book-Tax Income Gap is calculated as hand-collected Pre-Tax
Income less estimated Taxable Income, where Taxable Income equals Federal Tax Expense divided by the Maximum Corporate Statutory Rate. Information on
Net Deferred Tax Assets (DTA) and Net Deferred Tax Liabilities (DTL) are also hand collected from income tax disclosures in 10-K and Annual Report filings.
Table 2: Book-Tax Income Gap and Share Attributable to Temporary Differences
Median Share Mean Share Aggregate ShareMedian Super- Median Share Mean Super-Firm ean hare Aggregate Super- Median Super- Attributable to Mean Super-Firm Attributable to Attributable toFirm Book-Tax Book-Tax Firm Book-Tax
Temporary Temporary TemporaryYear Income Gap ($M) Differences Income Gap ($M) Differences Income Gap ($M) DifferencesYear Differences Differences Differences
1993 9.6 64.3% -141.3 -35.7% -10,172.2 141.9%
1994 97.4 57.1 382.0 68.7 29,411.5 68.5
1995 113.7 65.7 371.8 309.2 28,629.9 79.1
1996 112.9 70.1 464.7 16.9 36,710.0 79.9
1997 58.9 69.9 335.8 181.2 26,525.4 68.5
1998 -14.5 70.0 51.7 -135.4 4,033.2 -76.9
1999 198.7 92.5 978.6 99.8 76,333.1 87.9
2000 133.6 85.2 725.1 221.6 56,561.1 104.4
2001 71.9 86.0 -363.0 133.1 -28,673.7 91.5
2002 304.0 73.0 -92.9 115.5 -7,336.7 -579.0
2003 601.7 77.4 1638.9 -126.2 129,472.2 52.5
2004 500.9 69.0 971.0 121.3 76,711.3 24.4
The Book-Tax Income gap is calculated as Book Income (hand-collected-Pretax Income) less Taxable Income, where Taxable Income is calculated as Current
Tax Expense divided by the Maximum Corporate Statutory Rate. Temporary differences are calculated as Deferred Tax Expense divided by the Maximum
Corporate Statutory Rate; Permanent differences are Book-Tax Income gap less Temporary differences.
Table 3: Components of Net Deferred Tax Assets and Liabilities ($M), Average per Super-Firm, 1993-2004
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of "Super-Firms" in Sample 72 77 77 79 79 78 78 78 79 79 79 79
Allowance for Doubtful Accounts 157 150 162 170 167 204 197 193 252 268 231 196
Benefits
Employee Benefits 240 237 232 283 336 394 427 387 459 506 505 553
Other Post-Employment Benefits 511 516 519 502 470 408 377 401 381 534 293 238
Pensions -24 -64 -72 -102 -102 -81 -119 -129 -170 -115 -150 -204
Credits and Carryforwards
Foreign Tax Credit Carryforwards 29 26 20 5 0 7 11 11 5 5 7 15
NOL Carryforwards 138 149 147 160 159 197 247 205 243 374 394 379
Tax Credits & Other Carryforwards 181 188 187 181 197 189 218 262 352 494 544 624
International Activity-Related 6 7 9 10 20 24 30 39 34 61 -31 -77
Inventory 10 12 15 8 10 12 12 18 9 5 2 -5
Mark-to-Mark Adjustments
Available for Sale Securities -2 6 -2 0 -5 -4 9 5 8 1 6 -9
Other Mark-to-Market Adjustments -116 -31 -195 -186 -262 -275 -319 -254 -180 -210 -304 -303
Merger & Acquistion-Releated -34 -35 -42 -46 -58 -59 -58 -34 -228 -223 -210 -209
Oil & Gas, Environmental 17 21 27 24 17 11 9 11 20 23 38 46
Other Assets 1076 1013 1053 1073 1138 1194 1171 1309 1447 1536 1566 1676
Other Liabilities -391 -396 -427 -464 -511 -493 -536 -674 -750 -683 -902 -800
Property
Intangible Assets -78 -85 -126 -168 -164 -147 -313 -379 -386 -144 -350 -308
Leases -346 -348 -374 -434 -476 -497 -527 -577 -595 -623 -612 -574
Property, Plant & Equipment -1444 -1409 -1395 -1433 -1458 -1432 -1542 -1584 -1671 -1984 -2035 -2120
Regulated Accruals and Deferrals -14 -16 -17 -19 -25 -26 -33 -36 -34 -40 -41 -45
Revenue-Related -1 9 16 34 37 -14 -8 -39 -21 -22 -3 38
U.S. State-related 5 2 -2 -4 -8 -17 -20 -10 -6 -3 0 -2
Subsidiary-Related Items -9 2 -10 -9 -13 -50 -207 -293 -366 -318 -387 -408
Valuation Allowance -235 -256 -246 -234 -234 -178 -228 -207 -239 -606 -569 -676
Information on deferred tax positions are hand collected from income tax disclosures in 10-K and Annual Report filings and assigned to 23 principal categories
based on frequency and monetary significance of disclosure items. Amounts presented here are annual averages per super-firm; super-firm is defined in the text.
Table 4: Detail of Select Components of Net Deferred Tax Assets and Liabilities ($M), Average per Super-Firm, 1993-2004
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Benefits
DTA 266 271 298 359 403 448 504 465 474 529 526 574
Employee Benefits DTL -26 -35 -66 -75 -67 -54 -77 -78 -15 -23 -22 -20
Other Post-Employment DTA 529 532 547 532 501 452 424 454 443 567 453 414
Benefits DTL -18 -17 -27 -30 -31 -45 -47 -53 -62 -34 -160 -176
DTA 50 34 42 29 33 41 17 1 9 39 40 35
DTL -75 -98 -113 -131 -136 -122 -136 -130 -179 -154 -190 -240
DTA 24 35 37 47 62 78 89 100 120 157 124 117
International Activity-Related DTL -18 -28 -27 -37 -42 -54 -60 -60 -86 -96 -155 -194
DTA 32 38 40 36 37 43 47 52 49 53 53 43
DTL -22 -26 -25 -28 -27 -31 -35 -34 -40 -47 -51 -48
Mark-to-Mark Adjustments
DTA 0 6 2 2 0 0 18 5 9 5 7 2Available for Sale Securities
DTL -2 0 -4 -2 -5 -4 -9 0 -1 -5 -1 -11
Other Mark-to-Market DTA 10 60 4 6 4 4 29 25 60 117 115 110
Adjustments DTL -125 -91 -199 -192 -266 -280 -348 -279 -240 -327 -420 -413
DTA 29 29 32 27 24 16 14 17 20 23 38 46Oil & Gas, Environmental DTL -11 -9 -4 -3 -8 -6 -5 -5 0 0 0 0
DTA 42 44 44 41 45 50 42 30 46 109 122 123
DTL -120 -129 -170 -209 -209 -197 -354 -410 -431 -253 -472 -431
DTA 24 19 21 20 15 15 5 4 8 2 2 2
Regulated Accruals and Deferrals DTL -39 -36 -39 -39 -40 -41 -38 -40 -42 -42 -44 -46
DTA 43 44 47 70 78 80 91 102 108 130 138 139
DTL -44 -35 -30 -37 -41 -94 -99 -141 -129 -151 -140 -101
Information on deferred tax positions are hand collected from income tax disclosures in 10-K and
based on frequency and monetary significance of disclosure items. Amounts presented are annual
primarily DTA or DTL, we do not present the DTA and DTL detail here.
Annual Report filings and assigned to 23 principal categories
averages per super-firm. For principal components which are
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Table 5: Distribution of Net Deferred Tax Assets as a Share of Firm Assets, 1993-2004
Super-Firm Sample
Sample Firms with Net Deferred Tax Liabilities Firms with Net Deferred Tax Assets
Size 5 -5 % -5 to -3 % -3 to 0 % 0 to 3 % 3 to 5 % 2 5 %
1993 72 25.0% 5.6% 26.4% 30.6% 2.8% 9.7%
1994 77 23.4 9.1 20.8 36.4 6.5 3.9
1995 77 20.8 13.0 24.7 31.2 5.2 5.2
1996 79 24.1 6.3 30.4 25.3 10.1 3.8
1997 79 22.8 10.1 29.1 26.6 7.6 3.8
1998 78 23.1 9.0 23.1 30.8 7.7 6.4
1999 78 26.9 5.1 25.6 30.8 6.4 5.1
2000 78 25.6 5.1 30.8 26.9 5.1 6.4
2001 79 24.1 6.3 27.8 25.3 10.1 6.3
2002 79 22.8 7.6 27.8 25.3 2.5 13.9
2003 79 26.6 3.8 31.6 21.5 7.6 8.9
2004 79 25.3 8.9 30.4 17.7 10.1 7.6
Individual Firm Sample
Sample Firms with Net Deferred Tax Liabilities Firms with Net Deferred Tax Assets
Size 5 -5 % -5 to -3 % -3 to 0 % 0 to 3 % 3 to 5 % 2 5 %
1993 198 21.3% 6.4% 21.3% 39.1% 4.5% 7.4%
1994 216 19.5 6.8 22.7 34.5 10.0 6.4
1995 227 16.5 8.2 27.3 32.5 7.8 7.8
1996 279 17.0 7.1 25.4 35.0 6.7 8.8
1997 260 16.4 7.3 20.6 35.9 8.8 11.1
1998 229 16.5 7.4 18.6 36.4 9.5 11.7
1999 186 20.2 5.3 19.1 38.3 7.4 9.6
2000 165 18.6 7.2 22.2 34.7 9.6 7.8
2001 144 18.6 5.5 23.4 32.4 6.9 13.1
2002 131 18.0 6.0 26.3 28.6 3.0 18.0
2003 124 22.2 6.3 27.0 23.0 10.3 11.1
2004 118 21.7 9.2 28.3 22.5 7.5 10.8
Information on Net DTA and Net DTL are hand-collected from income tax disclosures in 10-K and Annual Report
filings. Assets is Compustat Total Assets (DATA6). The distribution in the upper panel is calculated at the super-firm
level; the distribution in the lower panel is calculated with each individual firm as its own observation.
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Table 6: Distribution of Net DTAs and DTLs as a Share of Firm Assets: Financial and Non-
Financial Firms. 1993-2004
Financial Firms
Sample Firms with Net Deferred Tax Liabilities Firms with Net Deferred Tax Assets
Size < -5 % -5 to -3 % -3 to 0 % 0 to 3 % 3 to 5 % 2 5 %
1993 34 0.0% 0.0% 23.6% 73.5% 0.0% 2.9%
1994 35 0.0 0.0 28.6 54.3 11.4 5.7
1995 36 0.0 2.8 36.1 52.8 0.0 8.3
1996 39 0.0 2.6 41.0 46.2 2.6 7.7
1997 38 0.0 2.6 50.0 42.1 0.0 5.3
1998 37 2.7 0.0 48.6 43.2 2.7 2.7
1999 31 0.0 3.2 35.5 58.1 3.2 0.0
2000 24 4.2 4.2 37.5 54.2 0.0 0.0
2001 23 0.0 4.3 43.5 39.1 8.7 4.3
2002 22 0.0 4.5 45.5 45.5 4.5 0.0
2003 21 0.0 0.0 47.6 47.6 4.8 0.0
2004 18 0.0 0.0 50.0 44.4 5.6 0.0
Non-Financial Firms
Sample Firms with Net Deferred Tax Liabilities Firms with Net Deferred Tax Assets
Size < -5 % -5 to -3 % -3 to 0 % 0 to 3 % 3 to 5 % > 5 %
1993 168 25.6% 7.7% 20.8% 32.1% 5.4% 8.3%
1994 185 23.2 8.1 21.6 30.8 9.7 6.5
1995 195 19.5 9.2 25.6 28.7 9.2 7.7
1996 244 19.7 7.8 23.0 33.2 7.4 9.0
1997 224 19.2 8.0 15.6 34.8 10.3 12.1
1998 194 19.1 8.8 12.9 35.1 10.8 13.4
1999 157 24.2 5.7 15.9 34.4 8.3 11.5
2000 143 21.0 7.7 19.6 31.5 11.2 9.1
2001 122 22.1 5.7 19.7 31.1 6.6 14.8
2002 111 21.6 6.3 22.5 25.2 2.7 21.6
2003 105 26.7 7.6 22.9 18.1 11.4 13.3
2004 102 25.5 10.8 24.5 18.6 7.8 12.7
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Information on Net DTA and Net DTL are hand collected from income tax disclosures in 10-K and Annual Report
filings. Assets is Compustat Total Assets (DATA6). The distribution is calculated with each individual firm as its own
observation. The sample parallels that of the individual firm analysis in the lower panel of Table 5. Industry was
determined using two-digit SIC codes; financial firms are SIC code 61-67.
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Table 7: Extranolations of Aegreigate DTAs and DTLs b er(B
Deferred Tax Assets Deferred Tax Liabilities Net Deferred Tax Position
Year Sample Economy Industry Sample Economy Industry Sample Economy Industry
Total Multipliers Multipliers Total Multipliers Multipliers Total Multipliers Multipliers
Asset Sales Asset Sales Asset Sales Asset Sales Asset Sales Asset Sales
1993 192 535 533 454 491 -216 -600 -598 -566 -570 -23 -65 -65 -113 -78
1994 208 562 557 507 526 -231 -625 -620 -610 -605 -23 -63 -63 -103 -78
1995 211 600 580 535 539 -251 -715 -691 -669 -647 -40 -114 -111 -134 -108
1996 223 621 601 549 556 -274 -764 -740 -717 -692 -51 -143 -139 -168 -136
1997 231 645 631 581 587 -291 -815 -797 -781 -752 -61 -170 -166 -200 -164
1998 239 752 721 681 705 -289 -908 -870 -849 -843 -49 -155 -149 -168 -139
1999 248 730 713 700 696 -342 -1006 -983 -974 -943 -94 -276 -270 -274 -247
2000 257 739 716 754 700 -364 -1048 -1016 -1056 -983 -107 -309 -300 -302 -282
2001 295 794 799 843 810 -409 -1100 -1106 -1065 -1006 -113 -305 -307 -222 -196
2002 355 941 949 924 953 -447 -1184 -1195 -1118 -1166 -92 -243 -246 -194 -213
2003 356 910 950 900 957 -514 -1316 -1374 -1201 -1295 -159 -406 -424 -302 -338
2004 367 861 1007 944 1012 -523 -1226 -1434 -1288 -1424 -156 -366 -428 -344 -412
Multipliers are calculated using Total Assets (DATA6) and Sales (DATA 12) for all Compustat firms with a U.S. or a Puerto Rico domicile and a non-subsidiary
stock ownership code. Industry multipliers are applied at the individual firm level using two-digit SIC codes.
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Table 8: Mean Impact of Federal Statutory Rate Decrease to 30% ($M)
Panel A: All Super-Firms
Beginning of Revaluation Current Direct Total
Number of Period Adj Net Effect on Period Fed Effect on Effect on
Year Super-Firms DTA NI Tax Exp NI NI
1994 67 -439 63 562 80 143
1995 71 -389 56 605 86 142
1996 70 -510 73 760 109 181
1997 72 -580 83 771 110 193
1998 70 -672 96 777 111 207
1999 70 -570 81 1,104 158 239
2000 70 -1,243 178 1,202 172 349
2001 72 -1,505 215 570 81 296
2002 73 -1,725 246 749 107 353
2003 74 -1,549 221 864 123 345
2004 75 -2,403 343 1,015 145 488
Panel B: Super-Firms with Beginning of Period Net DTA
1994 29 1,472 -210 656 94 -117
1995 31 1,431 -204 693 99 -105
1996 29 1,154 -165 689 98 -66
1997 30 1,268 -181 648 93 -89
1998 28 1,518 -217 593 85 -132
1999 33 1,552 -222 880 126 -96
2000 31 1,410 -201 952 136 -66
2001 26 1,713 -245 608 87 -158
2002 33 1,536 -219 521 74 -145
2003 29 2,598 -371 606 87 -285
2004 26 2,068 -295 721 103 -192
Panel C: Super-Firms with Beginning of Period Net DTL
1994 38 -1,897 271 490 70 341
1995 40 -1,800 257 536 77 334
1996 41 -1,687 241 811 116 357
1997 42 -1,901 272 860 123 394
1998 42 -2,132 305 900 129 433
1999 37 -2,463 352 1,304 186 538
2000 39 -3,353 479 1,400 200 679
2001 46 -3,325 475 548 78 553
2002 40 -4,415 631 937 134 765
2003 45 -4,222 603 1,031 147 750
2004 49 -4,775 682 1,171 167 849
The sample is limited to firms who separately report Federal Tax Expense. We adjust Beginning of Period
Net DTA for Credits and Available-for-sale Securities as discussed in section 4. All effects are calculated
assuming a 30% Federal Statutory Rate rather than the actual rate of 35%.
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Appendix A: Firms and Years in Sample
Our sample was constructed based on Fortune magazine's annual sales-based ranking of
US firms. The top 50 firms for each year from 1995 until 2004 were included in the sample. To
mitigate the effects of changes in firm size for each Fortune50 firm in the net deferred tax
analysis, the tax notes for all firms acquired or sold by Fortune 50 firms during the sample period
were also included. For example, Berkshire Hathaway acquired General Re Corp in 1998, so the
tax note information for General Re Corp was added to Berkshire Hathaway for years 1993-1997.
Similarly, AMR Corp spun off Sabre in 2000, so going forward, tax note details for Sabre were
added to AMR Corp for years 2000-2004. We use online firm histories and their 10-Ks to
research merger and acquisition information. Two firms were dropped from the sample due to
excessive private acquisitions. Four Fortune 50 firms were dropped due to insufficient
disclosures: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, State Farm and TIAA-CREF.
For the net deferred tax descriptive analysis the main Fortune 50 firm and all of its
acquired and divested were combined into a singe aggregate firm observation, summing over the
deferred tax and liability categories as well as total assets and market values. In the effective tax
rate analysis each individual firm-year observation was considered an independent observation
since the earnings management decisions examined operate at the firm level.
The following 74 Fortune 50 "super-firms" are included in our sample: Aetna Inc,
Allstate Corporation, Albertsons Inc, Altria Group, American Electric Power Company, American
International Group Inc, AmerisourceBergen Corporation, Amoco, AMR Corp, AOL Time
Warner Inc, Aquila Inc, AT&T Corp, Bank of America Corp, BellSouth Corp, Berkshire
Hathaway Inc, Cardinal Health, CenterPoint Energy Inc, Chevron Texaco Corporation, Cigna
Corp, Citigroup Inc, Chrysler, Coca-Cola Co, Columbia/HCA Health, ConAgra Foods Inc,
ConocoPhillips, Costco Wholesale Corporation, Dell Computer Corp, Dow Chemical Co, Duke
Energy Co, Dynegy Inc, Eastman Kodak, El Paso Corporation, Enron Corp, Exxon Mobil Corp,
Ford Motor Co, General Electric Co, General Motors Corp, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Hewlett
Packard Company, Home Depot Inc., Ingram Micro Inc., Intel Corp, International Paper Co,
International Business Machines, ITT Industries Inc, J C Penney Corp Inc, J P Morgan Chase &
Co, Johnson & Johnson, Kmart Holding Corporation, Kroger Co., Lockheed Martin Corp, Loews
Corporation, Lowe's, Marathon Oil Corp, MCI Worldcom, McKesson Corp, Merck & Co Inc,
Merrill Lynch & Co Inc, MetLife Inc, Microsoft Corp, Morgan Stanley, Motorola Inc, PepsiCo
Inc, Pfizer Inc, Procter and Gamble Co, Prudential Financial Inc, Safeway Inc, Sara Lee Corp,
SBC Communications Inc, Sears Roebuck Co, Supervalu Inc, Target Corporation, The Boeing
Company, United Parcel Service Inc, United Technologies, Valero Energy Corp, Verizon
Communications Inc, Walgreen Co, Walmart, Wells Fargo & Co, Xerox Corp.
The following 15 firms are included in our sample as part of another "super-firm": American
Stores, included with Albertsons Inc; Bank One, included with J.P. Morgan Chase & Co;
BankAmerica, included with Bank of America; Bell Atlantic, included with Verizon; Chase
Manhattan Corp, included with J.P. Morgan Chase & Co; Citicorp, included with Citigroup Inc;
Compaq Computer, included with Hewlett Packard Company; Conoco, included with
ConocoPhillips; DuPont E I De Nemours & Co, included with ConocoPhillips; GTE, included
with Verizon; Lucent, included with AT&T; Medco Health, included with Merck & Co Inc;
Mobil, included with ExxonMobil; Prudential Insurance, included with Prudential Financial Inc;
Texaco, included with Chevron Texaco Corporation.
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Appendix B: Classification of Deferred Tax Assets and Liabilities
Each deferred tax asset or liability category listed in a firm's 10-K tax footnote is classified
into one of the following aggregate categories:
* Allowances for doubtful accounts
* Employee benefits
* Other (non-pension) post-employment benefits
* Pensions
* Foreign tax credit carryforwards
* NOL carryforwards
* Tax credits and other carryforwards
* International activity-related
* Inventory
* Available for Sale Securities
* Other Mark-to-Market adjustments
* Merger & acquisitions-related
* Oil & Gas-related
* Intangible assets
* Leases
* Property, Plant & Equipment
* Regulated accruals and deferrals
* Revenue-related
* U.S. State tax related
* Subsidiary-related
* Valuation Allowances
Items that did not naturally fall into one of the above categories were classified as Other Assets
and Other Liabilities depending on the sign of the entry.
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